

The current global panzootic of H5N1 and its risk to humans

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Preparing for containment and
mitigation of pandemic H5N1 influenza

WHO workshop 14 November 2024


Statistical and Mathematical Modeling for
H5N1 Pandemic

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Key recent developments in HPAI epidemiology


- Exceptional global spread; panzootic most continents affected
- High infection pressure
 - Increased spread to domestic birds
 - High environmental contamination
 - Exposure to greater range of species of wild bird
- Mammalian infections: spillover to scavengers, some M2M transmission
- Dairy cattle infection in USA: sustained transmission non respiratory, back spill to domestic birds
- ‘Regular’ spill over to humans; occupational exposure
- H5 HPAI virus evolving with high fitness traits
- Antigenically clade 2.3.4.4b moderately stable

Confirmed Avian influenza events worldwide from 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023




Global distribution of Avian Influenza

1st October 2023- 26th September 2024



Introduction into Central and Latin America



PAHO



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Map production: PAHO Health Emergencies Department/ Health Emergency Information and Risk Assessment Unit/ GIS Team.

Avian Influenza Outbreak
Type of animal

- Poultry or domestic birds
- Wild birds
- ▲ Mammals

Major flyways

- Mississippi
- Pacific
- West Atlantic
- East Atlantic




0 1,500 3,000 6,000 km

Sources

- Data: World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) (2023). Retrieved on 12 May 2023. Data extracted by Pan American Health Organization. Reproduced with permission. WOAHA bears no responsibility for the integrity or accuracy of the data contained herein, but not limited to, any deletion, manipulation, or reformatting of data that may have occurred beyond its control.
- Cartography: WHO Detailed ADM0 Boundaries; Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna - Data Service (SHP) Major flyways of Arctic Birds Shapefile Accessed February 2023.

Spread to Antarctica

OFFLU ad-hoc group on HPAI H5 in wildlife of South America and Antarctica (2023) Continued expansion of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 in wildlife in South America and incursion into the Antarctic region.



Separate introductions into South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands and Falkland islands; spread to shelf



nature communications

Article

<https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-51490-8>

Detection and spread of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus H5N1 in the Antarctic Region

Received: 23 November 2023

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Ashley C. Banyard^{1,2}, Ashley Bennison³, Alexander M. P. Byrne^{1,4}, Scott M. Reid⁵, Joshua G. Lynton-Jenkins^{1,2}, Benjamin Mollott¹, Diliyani De Silva¹, Jacob Peers-Dent¹, Kim Finlayson⁶, Rosamund Hall³, Freya Blockley³, Marcia Blyth³, Marco Fatchieri¹, Zoe Fowler⁶, Elaine M. Fitzcharles³, Ian H. Brown^{1,2} & Joe James^{1,2}

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Suspected in penguins and shags on the Antarctic Peninsula and West Antarctic Coast

Fabiola León, Céline Le Bohec, Eduardo J. Pizarro, Loicka Baille, Robin Cristofari, Aymeric Houstin, Daniel P. Zitterbart, Gonzalo Barriga, Elie Poulin, Juliana A. Vianna
doi: <https://doi.org/10.1101/2024.03.16.585360>

This article is a preprint and has not been certified by peer review [what does this mean?]




Abstract Full Text Info/History Metrics

Preview PDF


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Iterative reassortment drove the emergence and propagation of the H5N1 panzootic



Transatlantic transmission

Putative transmission pathways between Europe and Newfoundland via migratory waterfowls/shorebirds



scientific reports

www.nature.com/scientificreports



Communication
Recurring Trans-Atlantic Incursion of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 Viruses by Long Distance Migratory Birds from Northern Europe to Canada in 2022/2023


Tamiru N. Alkie ^{1,†}, Alexander M. P. Byrne ^{2,†}, Megan E. B. Jones ^{3,4}, Benjamin C. Mollett ², Laura Bourque ³, Oliver Lung ¹, Joe James ^{2,5}, Carmencita Yason ⁴, Ashley C. Banyard ^{2,6}, Daniel Sullivan ¹, Anthony V. Signore ^{1,7}, Andrew S. Lang ⁸, Meghan Baker ⁷, Beverly Dawe ⁷, Ian H. Brown ^{2,8,*} and Yohannes Berhane ^{1,8,9,*}

OPEN

Transatlantic spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 by wild birds from Europe to North America in 2021

V. Callendo^{1,10}, N. S. Lewis^{2,11,12}, A. Pohlmann^{3,13}, S. R. Baillie^{11,13}, A. C. Banyard⁴, M. Beer¹, I. H. Brown⁸, R. A. M. Fouchier¹, R. D. E. Hansen¹, T. K. Lameris¹⁵, A. S. Lang⁸, S. Laurendeau⁷, O. Lung⁷, C. Robertson¹, H. van der Jeugd⁵, T. N. Alkie¹, K. Thorup^{12,16}, M. L. van Toor⁹, J. Waldenström⁹, C. Yason¹⁰, T. Kuiken^{1,17} & Y. Berhane^{1,18}

Global migration rates among the geographic regions of clade 2.3.4.4b (2020-2022)




Fusaro et al High pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe—Why trends of virus evolution are more difficult to predict, *Virus Evolution*, Volume 10, Issue 1, 2024, veae027, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ve/veae027>

Impacts on biodiversity




Reducing trend of disease burden in last 2 years


No. outbreaks in poultry - Northern hemisphere




No. outbreaks in poultry - Southern hemisphere



No. poultry killed and disposed of reported to WOA (in millions of heads) - world




No. wild birds dead reported to WOA (in thousands of heads) - world



Spread to mammals

- Captive bred animals: mink, foxes
- Wild Scavengers; ie foxes, seals, stoat, otter
- Domestic ; cats



American black bear (<i>Ursus americanus</i>)	Burmeister's porpoise (<i>Phocoena spinipinnis</i>)	European polecat (<i>Mustela putorius</i>)	Porpoise (<i>Phocoena phocoena</i>)
American mink (<i>Neogale vison</i>)	Caspian seal (<i>Pusa caspica</i>)	Ferret (<i>Mustela furo</i>)	Raccoon (<i>Procyon lotor</i>)
American pine marten (<i>Martes americana</i>)	Cat (<i>Felis catus</i>)	Fisher cat (<i>Pekania pennanti</i>)	Red fox (<i>Vulpes vulpes</i>)
Amur leopard (<i>Panthera pardus orientalis</i>)	Chilean dolphin (<i>Cephalorhynchus eutropia</i>)	Grey seal (<i>Halichoerus grypus</i>)	Skunk (<i>Mephitis mephitis</i>)
Amur tiger (<i>Panthera tigris</i>)	Common dolphin (<i>Delphinus delphi</i>)	Harbour seal (<i>Phoca vitulina</i>)	South America fur seal (<i>Arctophoca australis</i>)
Asiatic black bear (<i>Ursus thibetanus</i>)	Coyote (<i>Canis latrans</i>)	Japanese raccoon dog (<i>Nyctereutes viverrinus</i>)	South American bush dogs (<i>Speothos venaticus</i>)
Bobcat (<i>Lynx rufus</i>)	Dog (<i>Canis familiaris</i>)	Kodiak grizzly bear (<i>Ursus arctos horribilis</i>)	South American sea lion (<i>Otaria flavescens</i>)
Beech marten (<i>Martes foina</i>)	Eurasian badger (<i>Meles meles</i>)	Marine otter (<i>Lontra felina</i>)	Virginia opossum (<i>Didelphis virginiana</i>)
Bottlenose dolphin (<i>Tursiops truncatus</i>)	Eurasian lynx (<i>Lynx lynx</i>)	Mountain lion (<i>Puma concolor</i>)	White-sided dolphin (<i>Lagenorhynchus acutus</i>)
Brown bear (<i>Ursus arctos</i>)	Eurasian otter (<i>Lutra lutra</i>)	North American river otter (<i>Lontra canadensis</i>)	Pig (<i>Sus scrofa</i>)

HPAI in mammals - impact on biodiversity

Mass mortality events (biodiversity)

More than **51,000** mammals died in South America (Oct-22 Nov-23)



© AFP

More than 10,000 dead South American sea lions in Peru




21 December, 2023

Continued expansion of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5 in wildlife in South America and incursion into the Antarctic region



H5 detections: Expanded host range

Timeline of number of outbreaks of HPAI from 2020 to present



Reporting by mammal category October 2023 – September 2024

Number of countries/territories reporting
HPAI cases in mammals



- **Companion animals** : cats and dogs
- **Farmed fur-bearing mammals** : 4 species (*American mink*, *Arctic fox*, *raccoon dog*, *sable*)
- **Marine mammals** : 4 species (*Antarctic fur seal*, *South American fur seal*, *South American sea lion*, *Southern elephant seal*)
- **Other domestic mammals** : 3 species (*alpaca*, *bovine*, *goat*)
- **Terrestrial wild mammals**: 13 species (e.g. *raccoon*, *red fox*, *Eurasian otter*)

Semi-aquatic mammals in South America

Mammal to mammal transmission




Outbreaks in captive bred mammals

Spain ; Oct 22 outbreak in mink farm (52k)



A. Gene composition of H5N1 A/gull/France/22P015977/2022-like genotype



HA gene




Limited adaptive genetic changes in the virus (T271A in the PB2 gene)

Montserrat et al (<https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2023.28.3.2300001>)


H5N1 HPAI in fur farms in Finland July-Oct 2023



A. Detection of fur farms with HPAI A(H5N1), by week and municipality



B. Location of fur farms with HPAI A(H5N1)



- Initial point introductions from wild birds
- Secondary spread between fur farms
- Up to 7 genetic changes associated with mammalian adaptation but not all viruses
- Depopulation and other control measures
- Prophylactic vaccination of fur farm workers now offered

Eurosurveillance Europe's journal on infectious disease surveillance, epidemiology and global health

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Outbreaks [Open Access](#)

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infections on fur farms connected to mass mortalities of black-headed gulls, Finland, July to October 2023

[Check for updates](#)


Lauri Kareinen¹, Nina Tamminen¹, Ari Kauppinen¹, Bianca Zecchin², Ambra Pastorini², Isabella Monne², Calogero Terregino², Edoardo Giussani², Riikka Kaarto³, Veera Karkamo³, Tanja Laitinen³, Hanna Lounela³, Tuula Kantala³, Ilona Laamanen³, Tina Nokireki³, Laura London³, Otto Helve⁴, Sohvi Kääriläinen⁴, Niina Ikonen⁴, Jari Jalava⁴, Laura Kalin-Mänttari⁴, Anna Katz⁴, Carita Savolainen-Kopra⁴, Erika Lindh⁴, Tarja Siirtonen⁴, Essi M. Korhonen⁵, Kirsi Aaltonen⁵, Monica Galliano⁶, Alice Fusaro⁶, Tuula Gadd¹

Companion animals: H5 HPAI

- H5N1 HPAI infections in cats have been widely reported
 - Variable clinical manifestations, including respiratory and neurological signs, often fatal outcomes.
 - Infection via exposure to infected birds, other animals, contaminated feed or in the milking parlour!
 - Captivity die offs ie Large cats in zoos
-
- Dogs susceptible
 - Very infrequent reports



The virus driving the impact!




The 2021-24 H5N1 HPAI is the most infectious and dangerous of strains to date

Multiple evolved traits



H5N1 HPAI viruses have enhanced survival kinetics in the environment

- D_t is time taken in days for a 90% reduction in viral infectivity, (a 1 \log_{10} decrease) at temperature t .
- Survival of H5N1-2021 at 4°C is 43.2 days dose adjusted



- H5N1-2021 at 4°C D_4 of 9.5 days (R^2 0.93, to 6 weeks) $X=0$ at 43.2 days
- H5N1-2021 at 20°C D_{20} of 4.5 days (R^2 0.87, to 3 weeks) $X=0$ at 17.2 days
- H5N1-2021 at 30°C D_{30} of 2.3 days (R^2 0.88, to 2 weeks) $X=0$ at 8.7 days

Warren et al (2024) Assessment of Survival Kinetics for Emergent Highly Pathogenic Clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx Avian Influenza Viruses. Viruses 2024, 16, 889. <https://doi.org/10.3390/v16060889>



Spread of H5N1 HPAI to dairy cattle

H5N1 HPAI dairy cattle outbreak 10th March 2024 to present

Cases 492/15 states


**Number of Confirmed Cases in Cattle by State,
Total Outbreak**


Legend



Dairy cattle; infection and epidemiology

- Single spill over of H5N1 HPAI (B3.13 genotype)
- Initial signs are drop in feed intake and milk output
- Mastitis
- Symptoms range from asymptomatic to lethal
- Viral load in milk can be very high
- Almost exclusively lactating cows
- More in older animals
- Replication largely in mammary gland
- Respiratory infection at best transient
- Spread pathways mechanical ie via fomite, or movement of infected animals but high uncertainties
- Substantial opportunities for human exposure ie in milking parlours
 - 46 human cases in USA since March 24
 - PPE use/compliance limited






Human case summary associated with dairy cattle epidemic (16/10/24)

State	Cattle	Poultry	Unknown	State Total
California	21	0	0	21
Colorado	1	9	0	10
Michigan	2	0	0	2
Missouri	0	0	1	1
Texas	1	0	0	1
Washington	0	11	0	11
Source Total	25	20	1	46









Pasteurisation kills live virus in the milk



https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/index.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fbird-flu%2Fphp%2Favian-flu-summary%2Findex.html

Do the cattle and goat H5N1 viruses pose risk to humans?



Cattle and goat H5N1 viruses retain affinity for avian-like receptor analogue 3SLN.

Do the cattle and goat H5N1 viruses pose risk to humans?




pH
stability

Cattle

Goat

Control




pH 5.9



Optimum pH
fusion for
human cells:
<5.5

Optimum pH
fusion for Avian
cells: >5.5

pH 6.0




Cattle and goat H5N1 viruses retained avian-like phenotype and showed membrane fusion at pH5.9.

Have the viruses changed antigenically in last two years :relevance for vaccines?

Year	Clade	Subtype	Region	Subtype Clade	A/Vietnam/1194/2004/1 <i>A/chicken/Vietnam/258/04</i>	A/Turkey/turkey/2005 <i>A/swan/Hungary/4999/2006</i>	A/Hu/1/2005 <i>A/Duck/Anhui/1/2006</i>	A/chicken/Nepal/7360/2014 <i>A/Duck/Guangdong/S1322/2010</i>	A/mynah/Indonesia/13064792-010/2011 <i>A/Duck/Sukoharjo/BBVW/1428-9/2012</i>	A/Duck/Cambodia/14241D3/2021 <i>A/whooper swan/Shanxi/4-1/2020</i>	A/mallard/Georgia/DT09382/2017 <i>A/chicken/ME-2018</i>	A/mute_Swan/Croatia/102/2016 <i>A/green-winged teal/Egypt/8-77/2016</i>	A/gyrfalcon/Washington/41088/6/2014 <i>A/Gyrfalcon/MA/41088-6/2014</i>
					1	2.2	2.3.4	2.3.2.1a	2.3.2.1c ¹ /g ²	2.3.4.4b	2.3.4.4b	2.3.4.4b	2.3.4.4b
2023	2.3.2.1a	H5N1	South Asia		4.8	4.8	5.6	3.9	2.7	7.5	6.6	7.2	
2023	2.3.2.1a	H5N1	South Asia		6.3	6.4	7.2	5.0	3.8	8.3	7.5	8.0	
2023	2.3.2.1a	H5N1	South Asia		5.3	4.8	5.8	2.9	2.3	7.3	6.5		
2023	2.3.2.1a	H5N1	South Asia		4.5	3.9	4.8	2.5	1.1	4.9	4.0		4.0
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Africa		5.1	5.1	5.3	5.5	4.1	1.1	0.7		1.1
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Africa		5.9	5.9	6.5	5.4	3.3	3.7	3.0		2.8
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Africa		6.2	5.8	6.1	6.0	5.2	2.0	2.0		2.9
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Africa		6.0	6.3	6.9	6.0	3.7	4.0	3.0	4.7	2.9
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Africa		4.8	4.9	5.5	4.3	2.0	4.3	3.5	4.3	3.1
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Americas		5.1	5.7	6.1	6.0	3.6	4.0	3.3	5.1	2.6
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Americas		4.7	4.9	5.4	4.8	2.6	3.4	2.6	3.8	2.2
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Americas		5.0	5.3	5.7	5.7	3.7	2.4	1.7	3.6	1.1
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Americas		5.2	5.5	5.9	5.8	3.8	2.3	1.7	3.5	1.2
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.0	5.3	5.7	5.5	3.5	2.4	1.7	3.4	1.2
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.1	5.1	5.7	4.9	3.0	2.8	2.1	3.0	1.8
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		4.7	4.8	5.1	5.3	3.7	1.5	0.7	2.4	0.7
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.5	5.8	6.2	5.9	3.9	2.6	2.0	3.6	1.5
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		4.9	5.0	5.4	5.2	3.4	2.0	1.3	2.6	1.1
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.1	5.3	5.8	5.2	3.1	3.1	2.4	3.7	1.9
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.0	5.1	5.4	5.6	4.0	1.3	0.6	2.5	0.6
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		4.9	5.1	5.5	5.2	3.2	2.4	1.7	3.2	1.3
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.0	5.4	5.8	5.6	3.5	2.7	2.0	3.8	1.4
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.1	5.1	5.3	5.5	4.1	1.1	0.6	1.9	1.1
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.1	5.3	5.7	5.6	3.7	2.1	1.4	3.1	1.0
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		5.3	5.4	5.8	5.2	3.3	2.6	2.0	3.1	1.7
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Europe		4.5	4.6	4.9	5.2	3.6	1.5	0.7	2.3	0.8
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	South Asia		4.6	4.4	4.9	4.3	2.7	2.6	1.8	2.3	1.8
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Southeast Asia		4.8	4.4	4.7	4.7	3.9	2.2	1.9	0.9	2.4
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N1	Southeast Asia		4.9	5.5	5.6	6.2	4.2	2.1	1.5	3.8	0.8
2023	2.3.4.4b	H5N5	Europe		5.6	5.7	6.1	5.5	3.6	2.6	2.0	3.2	1.7

'Relatively' stable given established across the world



Multiple clades circulating; antigenic heterogeneity

- Despite transmission between hosts dominant 2.3.4.4b relatively stable
- Host specific adaptive changes not altering antigenic phenotype YET!
- Variation on how each host see's virus antigenically?
- Creates an environment for ease of vaccine strain selection
 - Regional variations
 - Multiple clades = multivalent
- Reduction of threat from cattle via vaccination?
 - Field Studies with Nonviable, Non-replicating Veterinary Vaccines Targeting Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Livestock <https://www.aphis.usda.gov/news/program-update/cvb-notice-24-13-field-studies-nonviable-non-replicating-veterinary-vaccines>



General recommendations

The animal health sector

Biosecurity to reduce spillover or spillback of AI into poultry, livestock value chains and mammals including humans

- Surveillance in wild and domestic birds including whole genome sequencing where economically feasible
- Sensitisation of stakeholders to increase understanding of the risks associated with HPAI
- Emergency preparedness and contingency planning for HPAI including capacity building and fitness for purpose of diagnostic testing

Recommendations

OFFLU urges the scientific community to continue to

- Monitor HPAI events in animals and report to WOAHA. Include HPAI in differential diagnosis in non-avian species, including cattle and other livestock populations with high risk of exposure to HPAI viruses.
- Timely deposition and sharing genetic sequence data in publicly available databases in order to monitor viral evolution and potential transmission pathways.
- Coordinate studies to better understand pathogenesis, transmission and adaptation of virus lineages and share the results with OFFLU.
- Provide support to national risk managers.

Key Conclusions

- Exceptional global spread; panzootic most continents affected
 - Continues to be a significant threat to biodiversity
- High infection pressure resulting in increased wild bird host range and continuing if not declining cases in domestic birds
- Mammalian infections: spillover to scavengers, some M2M transmission
- Dairy cattle infection in USA: continuing outbreak with spread (15 states); vaccination in future?
- H5 HPAI virus evolving with high fitness traits
- Antigenically clade 2.3.4.4b moderately stable
- Vaccination remains an important tool for prevention/control in some countries/regions

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Thank you for your attention



Passion
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Preventing and controlling viral diseases

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Updated joint FAO/WHO/WOAH assessment of recent influenza A(H5N1) virus events in animals and people

Assessment based on data as of 18 July 2024

14 August 2024

Key points

At the present time, based on available information, FAO-WHO-WOAH assess the global public health risk of influenza A(H5N1) viruses to be low, while the risk of infection for occupationally exposed persons is low to moderate depending on the risk mitigation measures in place. Transmission between animals continues to occur and, to date, a limited number of human infections have been reported. Although additional human infections associated with exposure to infected animals or contaminated environments are likely to continue to occur, the overall public health impact of such infections at a global level is minor.



Resolution 28:
Strategic
Challenges in
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Control of High
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Global strategy for the prevention and control of
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