




World Health
Organization



CORC Filovirus Research & Development Roadmap

3 MARCH 2026



R&DBlueprint

Powering research
to prevent epidemics

anrs
MALADIES INFECTIEUSES
EMERGENTES **Inserm**

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45 **Abbreviations**

46 Ag-RDT : antigen rapid diagnostic test

47 ANRS MIE : French National Agency for Research on HIV and Emerging Infectious Diseases

48 BDBV: Bundibugyo virus

49 BSL: Biosafety Level

50 CORC: Collaborative Open Research Consortia

51 EBOV: Ebola virus

52 MARV: Marburg virus

53 R&D : Research and Development

54 RESTV: Reston virus

55 SUDV: Sudan virus

56 TAFV: Taï Forest virus

57 WHO: World health organization

58 **Preamble**

59 In recent decades, the global epidemiological landscape has been marked by an increasing
60 frequency and geographic spread of infectious disease outbreaks. In this context of heightened
61 epidemic risk, strengthening research capacities and international collaboration is essential to
62 improve preparedness and enable rapid responses to emerging health threats.

63 To support this objective, the World Health Organization has identified a set of priority pathogen
64 families with epidemic and pandemic potential and promotes research strategies that focus on
65 these groups. As part of this approach, Collaborative Open Research Consortia (CORCs) have
66 been established to foster coordinated scientific efforts, facilitate open data sharing, and
67 accelerate the development of medical countermeasures and public health interventions.

68 The *Filovirus* CORC focuses on R&D blueprint WHO priority pathogens and prototype
69 pathogens from the *Filoviridae* family, including Ebola virus and Marburg virus, which cause
70 severe viral hemorrhagic fevers and recurrent outbreaks. Coordinated by ANRS Emerging
71 Infectious Diseases, the Filovirus CORC aims to identify key research priorities and guide the
72 development of knowledge and tools needed to strengthen preparedness and response to future
73 filovirus outbreaks The Filovirus CORC has been tasked to update the WHO AFIRM strategy
74 roadmap 2021-2031 provided by the MARVAC consortium, with significant achievements such
75 as the development of standardized CORE protocols for filovirus vaccine and therapeutic trials,
76 accelerated deployment of candidate vaccines during outbreaks, and strengthened global
77 collaboration between research institutions, health authorities, and affected communities

78 **Scope**

79 This *Filovirus* research and development roadmap outlines the key scientific priorities and
80 operational considerations required to strengthen preparedness and response to filovirus disease
81 outbreaks. It presents the current thematic landscape and state of knowledge on filoviruses,
82 highlighting major findings, emerging trends, and critical data gaps that need to be addressed
83 to advance the field. It builds on substantial work already undertaken by researchers, public
84 health agencies, and international organizations—including the WHO and partner networks—
85 to ensure continuity with existing evidence, tools, and strategic frameworks.

86 The roadmap also identifies existing operational assets that support research and outbreak
87 response efforts, examines the principal challenges facing the filovirus research community,
88 and defines strategic objectives to guide future scientific activities and collaboration. In
89 addition, it considers several transversal considerations that cut across research domains —
90 social sciences, issues of equity and access to knowledge, tools, and medical countermeasures.
91 Across the five working groups, additional structural constraints and shared scientific needs
92 consistently emerged. These cross-cutting challenges shape the feasibility, comparability, and
93 overall impact of filovirus research and preparedness efforts across all priority families and
94 their associated CORCs. Five dedicated working groups were convened to structure collective
95 expertise and ensure comprehensive coverage of the scientific and operational priorities. Each
96 group was coordinated by a designated lead and composed of multidisciplinary experts
97 contributing their knowledge across the key thematic areas: virus ecology, diagnostics,
98 pathophysiology and disease models, vaccines, and treatments.

99 The virus Ecology working group was coordinated by Ahidjo Ayouba, with contributions from
100 Kofi Bonney, Karifa Kourouma, Benjamin T. Vonhm, Sanaba Boumbaly, Almudena Mari Saez,
101 Sung Joon Park, Alpha Kabinet Keita, Vincent Cicculi, and Armelle Pasquet-Cadre.

102 The diagnostics working group, led by Eddy Kinganda Lusamaki, brought together Bolarinde
103 Lawal, Cathy Roth, Gavin Harris, Apiyo Paska, Yonas Tegegn Woldemariam, Anaïs Legand,
104 Luisa Enria, Vincent Cicculi, and Armelle Pasquet-Cadre

105 The Pathophysiology and Disease Models Working Group was coordinated by Hervé Raoul,
106 with the participation of Lisa Hensley, Dave Safronetz, Logan Banadyga, Ngiambudulu
107 Francisco, and Simon Funnell, Mélanie Nguyen-Marzin, and Armelle Pasquet Cadre

108 The Vaccines working group, under the leadership of Beth Ann Coller, included Alex Lehrer,
109 Sylvain Baize, Mathieu Mateo, Sandhya Talasila, Deborah Watson Jones, Sylvain Faye, Yann
110 Le Duff, Bruce Kirenga, Daniela Manno, Paul Scott, Philip Renatus Krause, Meena Murmu,
111 and Armelle Pasquet-Cadre.

112 Finally, the Treatments working group was coordinated by Alexandra Calmy, with contributions
113 from Amanda Rojek, Elizabeth Higgs, Rafael Delgado, Placide Mbala Kingebeni, Denis Malvy,
114 Marie Jaspard, Beatrice Serra, Jamie Harper, Thomas Moench, Andre Siqueira, Ann Kelly,
115 Armand Sprecher, Frédérique Jacqueroz Bausch, Tom Fletcher, Tara Nyhuis, Pauline Vetter,
116 Esther Sterk, Mélanie Nguyen-Marzin, and Armelle Pasquet Cadre.

117 By establishing a shared understanding of research priorities and needs, this roadmap aims to
118 support coordinated actions and informed decision-making among stakeholders, as well as
119 funding organizations. Its development was made possible thanks to the collective engagement
120 of experts. Their diverse yet complementary areas of expertise created the scientific depth and
121 operational insight required to build a coherent, forward-looking roadmap. This
122 multidisciplinary collaboration has been instrumental in ensuring that the roadmap reflects both
123 the complexity of filovirus research and the practical realities of outbreak preparedness and
124 response.

125 **Executive summary**

126 Filoviruses remain a significant global health threat, particularly in resource-limited settings,
127 where surveillance, research, and funding have been insufficient since the 2013–2016 Ebola
128 epidemic in West Africa, which caused over 11,000 deaths. Additional filoviruses, such as
129 Bombali virus, Taï Forest virus, and Bundibugyo virus, remain poorly characterized, and their
130 potential risk to human populations is not fully understood. Given the ongoing and evolving
131 risk of filovirus outbreaks, urgent global collaborative efforts are required, including the
132 establishment of the Filovirus Collaborative Open Research Consortium and active engagement
133 of WHO Member States, research institutions, and funding organizations. These initiatives have
134 led to the creation of this roadmap, which provides a coherent and actionable framework for
135 guiding research priorities, fostering coordinated global efforts, and supporting timely,
136 evidence-based decision-making to mitigate future filovirus threats.

137 This filovirus research and development roadmap is structured around five thematic areas, each
138 playing a central role in advancing scientific understanding and enhancing preparedness and
139 response to filovirus disease outbreaks. The division into thematic areas reflects the multiple
140 approaches required to address the complexity of filoviruses, including their diverse biological
141 characteristics, modes of transmission, and multifactorial patterns of spread within human
142 populations. While each thematic area has a specific focus, many factors intersect across
143 themes, and several elements are relevant to all areas, highlighting the strong interconnections
144 within the filovirus research landscape. Furthermore, building public trust and addressing
145 sociocultural barriers are critical components for effective interventions, and these
146 considerations must be integrated across all thematic areas to reinforce global capacity to
147 anticipate, detect, and control filovirus outbreaks.

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155 In this context, the Top 10 research priorities offer a clear synthesis of the entire roadmap.
156 They translate the scientific, operational, and societal insights of all working groups into a
157 coherent agenda:

158 **1. Achieve and sustain licensure of vaccines for filovirus targets**

- 159 • Advance clinical development of additional filovirus vaccine candidates, including
160 SUDV and MARV vaccines, leveraging EBOV licensure experience to guide
161 development pathways.
- 162 • Explore pan-filovirus vaccines including multivalent and next-generation
163 approaches, with early down-selection criteria based on regulatory feedback,
164 harmonized immunogenicity, and functional assays
- 165 • Apply immunobridging to support product development when feasible supported by
166 validated correlates of protection, harmonized assays
- 167 • Validate filovirus-specific immune correlates of protection and durability
168 benchmarks to inform booster dose strategies
- 169 • Maintain outbreak-ready clinical trial platforms (e.g., SOLIDARITY), including
170 pre-approved protocols, trained teams, and interoperable data systems
- 171 • **Ensure inclusion of vulnerable and complex populations** (children, pregnant
172 women, high-risk groups) through adaptive trial designs and ethical frameworks
173 enabling early, disaggregated data
- 174 • Establish resilient manufacturing and supply ecosystems for filovirus vaccines
- 175 • **Reinforce and diversify therapeutic options to complement and reinforce**
176 **vaccination options, particularly in potential exposure scenarios**

177
178 **2. Design therapeutics targeting under-researched viruses**

179 Monitor, develop and evaluate monoclonal antibodies and antiviral agents for all
180 filoviruses

- 181 • Investigate host-directed therapies to modulate immune responses or block viral
182 replication
- 183 • Target viral persistence and sanctuary sites in survivors and in treated patient's
184 cohorts

185
186 **3. Build Experimental Models to Understand Immune and Pathological Mechanisms**

- 187 • Develop intermediate animal and in vitro models
 - 188 • Identify immune signatures linked to disease severity
 - 189 • Differentiate protective from pathogenic immune responses
- 190 In vitro, study the dynamics of filoviruses in susceptible bat species to study viral
191 shedding, distribution in different organs

192
193 **4. Monitor Patient and survivors Cohorts to Understand Immunity and Viral**
194 **Persistence**

- 195 • Assess safety, effectiveness, duration of protection, immune response, and viral
196 persistence sites

- 197
- Use simplified sampling strategies to reduce patient burden
- 198
- Document risks of flare-ups due to viral persistence in survivors
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- Intensify efforts to identify natural reservoirs and transmission pathways
 - Develop serological and molecular tools for ecological surveillance
 - Rethink sampling methods, species prioritization, and analytical approaches to overcome current limitations
 - Develop and implement effective early warning systems (EWS) to enable the timely detection of potential filovirus circulation and to support coordinated surveillance activities.
 - In the wild, perform longitudinal surveys in selected at-risk areas in Africa where filoviruses repeatedly occurred in the past to cope with seasonality;
 - In the wild, in selected bat species, perform longitudinal ecological monitoring via the use of marking systems.
- 5. Advance Research on Zoonotic Transmission**
- Reinforce coordination and rapid deployment of mobile laboratories
 - Ensure timely results for surveillance and patient management by supporting Ag-RDT development
 - Develop and validate serological and PCR tests suitable for field use
 - Develop sensitive, high throughput and low cost multiplex serology, PCR and multiplexed sequencing approaches for early characterisation
 - Harmonize serological and functional assays across countries to support immunobridging, correlates of protection, and cross-trial comparability
 - Strengthen reagent repositories and ensure alignment with WHO International Standards to support vaccine evaluation and regulatory decision-making
- 6. Strengthen Diagnostic and Field Laboratory Capacity**
- Study public perception and acceptance of vaccines and treatments
 - Identify strategies to enhance community engagement and adherence
 - Define indicators to guide and adapt communication efforts
 - Integrate early and continuous community engagement into vaccine and drug development and deployment strategies, especially for complex populations
- 7. Improve Social Acceptability of Medical Interventions**
- Maintain operational capacity between outbreaks to prevent loss of momentum
 - Support local networks and expertise with a continuity-based approach
 - Align biomedical research with social sciences, public health, and field actors
 - Expand trial networks: Scale beyond anchor sites to additional national institutes with lab and cold chain capacity
- 8. Reinforce Inter-Epidemic Preparedness and Coordination**

- 238
- **Establish rapid data-sharing agreements** across ministries, research institutions, and global partners. Align regulatory, ethical, and operational pathways to enable rapid activation of vaccine trials during outbreaks
- 239
- 240
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242 **9. Advance Therapeutic Evaluations and accelerate Clinical Trial Approvals**

- Standardize Protocols to Generate Clinical Evidence
 - Implement pan-filovirus CORE protocols with pre-approvals to ensure reactive, consistent feasibility, safety and efficacy data
 - Define optimized clinical supportive care and support training
 - Build and sustain infrastructure in risk areas
 - Strengthen reliance-based regulatory mechanisms (e.g., WHO EUL, AVAREF) to accelerate evaluation of vaccines and therapeutics during outbreaks
 - Harmonize immunogenicity endpoints and assay standards to support rapid, comparable evidence generation
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253 **10. Increase Visibility of Research to Mobilize Sustainable Funding**

- Foster interdisciplinary and interinstitutional collaboration
 - Position research as a central pillar of epidemic preparedness and response
 - Highlight the need for sustained investment in vaccine platforms, manufacturing capacity, and cold-chain resilience as core components of epidemic preparedness
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263 Introduction

264 Filoviruses are enveloped, negative-sense RNA viruses that belong to the family *Filoviridae*
265 within the order of *Mononegavirales*. They are further classified into eight genera. We will
266 focus on the two that contain human-pathogenic viruses: *Orthoebolavirus*,
267 *Orthomarburgvirus*. . Based on genomic organization and similarity of conserved genes,
268 member species are further segregated into several species. Notably, among the human-
269 infecting filoviruses, Ebola virus (EBOV), Sudan virus (SUDV), Bundibugyo virus (BDBV),
270 and Tai Forest virus (TAFV) are members of the genus *Orthoebolavirus*, while Marburg virus
271 (MARV) belongs to the genus *Orthomarburgvirus*.

272 EBOV (species *Orthoebolavirus zairense*) and MARV(species *Orthomarburgvirus*
273 *marburgense*) are responsible for most outbreaks to date and cause severe disease in humans
274 with high case-fatality rates.

275 EBOV has caused large outbreaks in West and Central Africa (Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia,
276 Democratic Republic of the Congo). SUDV outbreaks have occurred mainly in Sudan and
277 Uganda, while BDBV has been reported in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
278 TAFV caused a single documented human infection in Côte d'Ivoire. MARV has emerged in
279 Angola, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Kenya. RESTV, detected in
280 the Philippines and Vietnam, can infect humans but has not caused clinical disease.

281 Infections caused by filoviruses typically present as severe viral hemorrhagic fevers. Early
282 symptoms include fever, fatigue, muscle pain, and sore throat, and can progress to hemorrhage,
283 multi-organ failure, and shock. EBOV, SUDV, BDBV, and MARV are associated with
284 particularly high pathogenicity and mortality rates.

285 While therapeutic options for filovirus diseases remain limited, important progress has been
286 made in developing treatments that can be rapidly deployed during outbreaks. However, these
287 advances are largely specific to EBOV, and significant gaps persist across the broader filovirus
288 family, where no comparable countermeasures exist for most viruses.


289

290 Virus ecology

291 1. Thematic and state of knowledge


292 Since 1967 for Marburg virus disease (MVD) and 1976 for Ebola virus disease (EVD), there
293 have been 17 MVD and 42 EVD outbreaks worldwide respectively, mostly in sub-Saharan
294 Africa, with variable case fatalities, depending on the filovirus . Drivers of these outbreaks
295 remain very composite and include multiple factors such as trade, travel, wild game
296 consumption, failures of medical procedures, weakness in human health infrastructures, etc (1).
297 Although the drivers are not fully understood, the trend is towards an increase in the number
298 and frequency of outbreaks over time (Figures 1&2). However, we cannot exclude the
299 improvement of awareness, detection tools, surveillance and reporting systems. Molecular
300 evolution modelling of filoviruses using Bayesian inference estimated their Most Recent
301 Common Ancestor (MRCA) back to 10,000 years ago, while for *Othoebolavirus zairense*, the
302 MRCA is dated only to 50 years ago (2), compatible with its highest pathogenicity to its novel
303 human and non-human primates hosts.

304



305 **Figure1:** Trend of filoviruses (Ebola and Marburg viruses) outbreaks, by decades.

306 Adapted from raw data of WHO and CDC, accessed 9th January 2026.



307

308 **Figure 2:** average filovirus outbreak per year since 1967. Same source as in Figure1.

309

310

311

312 The reservoir host(s) and the ecology of filoviruses remain an open question, especially for
313 Orthoebolaviruses. While for Orthomarburgviruses, there is a consensus in the scientific
314 community to consider the Egyptian rousette bat (*Rousettus aegyptiacus*) as the natural host of
315 the virus, for EBOV, the question remains unanswered.

316 This section addresses the interactions between filoviruses, their host organisms, and the
317 environment, with the aim of identifying key knowledge gaps in filovirus ecology and outlining
318 potential mitigation pathways. Two major gaps remain central to advancing ecological
319 understanding:

- 320 • **What is the reservoir species of filoviruses?**
- 321 • **What are the outbreaks drivers?**

322

323 **2. Key Findings, Emerging Trends, and Data Gap**

324 **Reservoir of Filoviruses**

325 For MARV, as mentioned above, the natural host of virus is very likely *R. aegyptiacus*. The
326 virus has been detected, at molecular level and by serology, in different parts of Africa by
327 different teams and link with MVD outbreaks humans visiting caves where *R. aegyptiacus*
328 roosts has been established and MARV was detected in multiple instances in *R. aegyptiacus*
329 (3–6). This species, existing in two different subspecies, is widely distributed in sub-Saharan
330 Africa, from South Africa to the eastern part of the continent, in Kenya; and in West Africa up
331 to Guinea (7). For MARV, as mentioned above, the natural host of virus is very likely *R.*
332 *aegyptiacus*. The virus has been detected, at molecular level and by serology, in different parts
333 of Africa by different teams and linkand link with MVD outbreaks humans visiting caves where
334 *R. aegyptiacus* roosts has been established and MARV was detected in multiple instances in *R.*
335 *aegyptiacus* (3–6). This species, existing in two different subspecies, is widely distributed in
336 sub-Saharan Africa, from South Africa to the eastern part of the continent, in Kenya; and in
337 West Africa up to Guinea (7).

338 For orthoebolaviruses and more specifically the viruses infecting humans and non-human
339 primates, bats are the primary suspects. For example, genetic material of EBOV has been
340 detected in three frugivorous bat species (*H. montrosus*, *E. franqueti* and *M. torquata*) in an
341 investigation during EVD outbreaks in Gabon and Congo between 2001 and 2003 (8).The
342 authors sampled more 1,000 specimens from bats (630 specimens), birds and small mammals
343 around carcasses of chimpanzees and gorillas, victims of virus. This is the unique example of
344 positive detection of a small fragment (<500 bp) of viral genetic material of EBOV in bats.
345 Since then, thousands of bats sampled throughout sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa, the
346 Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Cameroon, Guinea, Gabon, etc.), including during
347 outbreaks, detected no EBOV RNA in blood and swabs (9–11). Nevertheless, RNA of another
348 orthoebolavirus, Bombali virus (species *Orthoebolavirus bombaliense*), have been readily
349 detected in Sierra Leone and Guinea in West Africa and Kenya and Mozambique is East Africa
350 in two bats species, *Chaerephon pumilus* and *Mops condylurus* (12–15). Inversely, varying
351 prevalence of antibodies to Ebola virus antigens have been detected by different groups in
352 different genera of bats throughout Africa, Asia and even Australia using different
353 methodologies (16–21). In other animal species, including wild ungulates and apes, viral RNA

354 has been detected in carcasses during outbreaks and antibodies in serum/plasma samples from
 355 live animals such as pigs, dogs, or wildlife killed for bushmeat (20,22–25). Since no Ebola virus
 356 RNA has been detected in these animals, except the RESTV in Philippines macaques, the more
 357 likely explanation is that mammals, and non-human primates the first of them, are rather victims
 358 than reservoirs of Ebola viruses (26). Finally, beside bats as putative reservoirs of Ebola virus,
 359 a paradigm change has occurred following the outbreak of 2021 in Guinea which showed
 360 evidence that a human survivor can be at a start of a novel outbreak years after an outbreak had
 361 been declared over (27). Survivors to Ebola virus diseases should thus be considered, to some
 362 extent, as potential reservoirs of the virus. In this case it will be important to use social sciences
 363 research methods to study survivors ‘social networks’ and develop a participatory approach to
 364 address the social and moral implications of human resurgences.

365 **Table 1:** summary of currently known potential Filoviruses reservoirs.

366	Genera	Reservoir	Evidence:	RNA	Ab
367	<i>Marburg Marburgvirus</i>	<i>R. aegyptiacus</i>		+++	+++
368	<i>Orthoebolavirus zairense</i>	Fruit bats			
369		<i>H. monstrosus</i>		±	++
370		<i>E. franqueti</i>		±	++
371		<i>M. torquata</i>		±	++
372		Other genera/species		-	++
373		<i>H. sapiens sapiens</i>		±*	++
374		Other mammals		±**	+
375	<i>Orthoebolavirus bombaliense</i>	Insectivorous bats			
376		<i>C. pumilus</i>		+	+
377		<i>M. condylurus</i>		+	+
378		<i>Other species</i>		-	±
379	Other Orthoebolavirus	various species		-	±

380 *: in survivors; **: in carcasses

381 There are two main hypotheses to explain the difficulty of identifying Filovirus reservoirs,
 382 except Orthomarburgvirus.

- 383 a. **Methodological issues.** The detection tools used are not sensitive enough. This is very
 384 unlikely because the PCR approaches used are highly sensitive and able to detect down
 385 to less than 10 copies/ microliter of extract. Another possibility is the sampling methods.
 386 Several teams working on wildlife, especially on bats, avoid lethal sampling, and rather
 387 take oral and rectal swabs and viral shedding might not be sufficient, or absent, or
 388 transient to the viral biology, especially in bats.
- 389 b. **Targeted hosts are not the right ones:** investigators of filovirus reservoirs have been
 390 focusing on mammals, and very rarely on arthropods. Given the large host spectrum of

391 the *Mononegavirales* order and the recent MRCA of filoviruses, some authors are now
392 not excluding the possibility that filoviruses descend from some plant viruses,
393 necessitating a small animal (insect?) as intermediate host before adaptation to a
394 mammalian host (for example a bat). This hypothesis has the advantage of explaining
395 the high seroprevalence of IgG directed against Ebola virus glycoproteins in areas where
396 no outbreak has ever been registered.
397

398 Hence, after half a century (1976-2026) since the first EVD outbreak and after 60 years since
399 the first MVD outbreak, there is a real need to develop new research pathways to study the
400 reservoirs of filoviruses, apart from the orthomareburgviruses. To this end, we need to combine
401 reservoir search and the drivers of outbreaks.

402 **Drivers of filovirus outbreaks** : As mentioned in the section above, there is trend towards
403 and increase in number and frequency of filovirus outbreaks, mainly in Africa. Since 2000,
404 there is, on average, at least one filovirus outbreak per year. This trend can be explained by
405 the improvement of surveillance, detection and reporting systems in various African countries.
406 The increasing number of outbreaks can also be explained by ecological factors including
407 climate change, land use change, human population growth associated with changes in
408 human/wildlife interactions, and human behaviours/activities.

409 Hence, anthropogenic activities, particularly industrial and artisanal mining, should be
410 considered a major determinant of filovirus emergence. Mining induces rapid land-use changes,
411 habitat fragmentation, and creation of artificial roosting and sheltering sites for bats and other
412 wildlife. In parallel, mining-related human mobility and settlement increase interfaces between
413 humans, wildlife, and potential viral reservoirs.

414 **Filling the gaps** : Two main knowledge gaps have been identified. The first is the
415 identification of the reservoirs of filoviruses. In this regard, it is crucial to go beyond bats. It
416 has been shown that different bat species can be successfully infected in vitro with various
417 filoviruses from different species, including MARV and EBOV. Bats are thus susceptible to
418 infection and survive it. Despite fifty years of efforts, the definitive demonstration is missing.
419 Actions proposed to address knowledge gaps :

- 420 1. In the wild, test additional species, including arthropods and ectoparasites of bats
421 and other mammals living in areas where filovirus outbreaks have occurred in the
422 past;
- 423 2. In the wild, perform longitudinal surveys in selected at risk areas in Africa where
424 filoviruses repeatedly occurred in the past to cope with seasonality;
- 425 3. In areas where longitudinal studies are conducted, perform socio-ecological studies
426 assessing how long-term environmental transformations, such as plantations,
427 poaching, mining activities, extensive agriculture, livestock production, eco-
428 tourism) may influence animal species presence, absence and distribution.
- 429 4. In humans, establish cohorts of filovirus survivors to study the immunity and the
430 virology to understand viral dynamics, including in immune privileged sites.
431 Moreover, in identifying survivors, it is crucial to distinguish between symptomatic
432 and pauci-symptomatic cases.

- 433 5. In the wild, in selected bat species, perform longitudinal ecological monitoring via
434 the use of marking system. This will allow to monitor the movements of these flying
435 mammals, ideally more than a year;
436 6. In vitro, study the dynamics of filoviruses in susceptible bat species to study viral
437 shedding, distribution in different organs at the relation of these parameters in
438 association with sex, age, gestational status;
439 7. Model outbreak risks based on ecological AND robust field and laboratory data

440 3. Operational Assets

441 Example of projects and Networks that could be leveraged, connected, or scaled to accelerate
442 progress. include:

443 **ZOOSURSY project** : it covers seventeen African countries : funded by the European
444 Union to enhance research, diagnostics, and policy to reinforce national veterinary
445 services, improve wildlife and livestock surveillance, harmonise diagnostic practices,
446 and build operational capacity for early detection of high-risk pathogens at the
447 human–animal–environment interface. Led by WOAHA, in collaboration with CIRAD,
448 IRD, Institut Pasteur, the Helmholtz Institute for One Health, and the University of
449 Helsinki, the project fosters One Health collaboration. The project enables rapid
450 mobilisation of wildlife surveillance teams, supports ecological investigations
451 (including bats and other potential reservoirs), strengthens diagnostic capacity in
452 affected regions, and facilitates data-sharing between veterinary and public-health
453 sectors.

454 The **CONTAGIO network**, funded under the French “PEPR Santé Globale”
455 programme and coordinated by a consortium of leading French research institutions
456 (including Inserm, CNRS, Institut Pasteur, IRD, and several universities), is designed
457 to build a **national and international research infrastructure dedicated to**
458 **anticipating, detecting, and responding to emerging infectious threats**. The
459 CONTAGIO network can rapidly activate expert networks, support genomic and
460 ecological investigations, mobilise modelling teams, facilitate data-sharing, and
461 connect national research capacities with international partners.

- 462 • The **Pasteur Network**, coordinated by the **Institut Pasteur**, is a global alliance of more
463 than 30 public health and research institutions across five continents, dedicated to
464 strengthening surveillance, laboratory capacity, and scientific collaboration on
465 infectious diseases. The network integrates expertise in virology, epidemiology,
466 entomology, genomics, and social sciences. The network can mobilized laboratory
467 teams, deploy diagnostic capacity, support genomic sequencing and field investigations,
468 and facilitate datasharing across countries. Its longstanding presence in Africa and other
469 highrisk regions makes it a critical platform for early detection, coordinated response,
470 and accelerated research during filovirus emergencies
- 471 • ANRS MIE partner sites and PRISME in Africa

472 4. Key challenges

473 The lives of humans and animals, whether wild or domestic, are interconnected; however, in
474 some context these relationships go beyond interaction and constitute forms of entanglement.

475 Anthropological work on hemorrhagic fever has highlighted that human and animal lives may
476 be mutually constituted and cannot be easily separated or understood in isolation. These
477 reciprocal processes of shaping of lives unfold across social, ecological and material domains
478 (28)

479 Human - animal relationships thus exist along a gradient of mutuality. They might be more or
480 less intimate, regular or sporadic, and take diverse forms, mediated by different material
481 conditions and motivated by a range of social, economic and ecological factors. Despite this,
482 relatively few studies that describe and analyze potential context of viral transmission with the
483 level of granularity required to capture these dynamics. Beyond understanding modes of
484 contact, and drivers of filoviruses outbreaks, virological fundamental research may benefit of
485 anthropology understanding of contextualized analysis, as it can provide essential insights into
486 how contact, transmission, and viral spillover are produced and understood (29).

487 From this perspective, interactions between human - bats (among other animals) cannot be
488 reduced solely to notions of biological risk. Human - bats lives might involve play, livelihood
489 strategies, economic means, health practices and religious or symbolic meanings (30,31)
490 However, risk communication and prevention campaigns have often reshaped local perceptions
491 of these relationships, sometimes framing specific animal species as threats or “villains”
492 (32). Such framing may oversimplify complex social realities and contribute to some population
493 ’ s groups’ stigma.

494 **5. Strategic Objectives**

495 **Short-Term Priorities (0–12 months)**

496 The development of Early Warning Systems based on the integration of ecological,
497 environmental, and human indicators is recommended. Such systems should aim at detecting
498 weak signals preceding human outbreaks and rely on continuous data collection, risk modelling,
499 and predefined alert thresholds to trigger preventive actions.

500 **Milestone:** A simple and effective early warning system (EWS) will be developed and
501 progressively implemented to enable the timely detection of potential filovirus circulation and
502 to support coordinated surveillance activities.

503 **Expected outputs:**

- 504 • Operational EWS prototype
- 505 • Standardized indicators and alert thresholds
- 506 • Initial datasets to trigger preventive actions

507 **Medium-Term Priorities (1-3 years)**

508 Filovirus ecology investigations should evolve toward an integrated and longitudinal
509 surveillance framework combining wildlife (bats, arthropods, and other mammals),
510 environmental drivers, and human populations. This includes ecological monitoring,

511 serological and virological surveys, and structured follow-up of filovirus survivor cohorts as
512 part of the ecosystem

513 **Milestones:**

- 514 1. Cohorts of filovirus survivors will be established to investigate long-term immunity and
515 viral persistence, including viral dynamics in immune-privileged sites.
- 516 2. Additional species will be investigated to broaden the understanding of potential
517 reservoirs and transmission pathways. Arthropods and ectoparasites associated with bats
518 and other mammals living in areas where filovirus outbreaks have previously occurred
519 will be collected and tested.
- 520 3. Longitudinal surveys will be conducted in selected high-risk areas in Africa where
521 filovirus outbreaks have repeatedly occurred in the past, allowing the investigation of
522 seasonal patterns and environmental drivers of viral circulation.
- 523 4. The dynamics of filoviruses in susceptible bat species will be investigated, focusing on
524 viral shedding, tissue distribution across organs, and their relationship with host
525 biological factors such as sex, age, and gestational status.

526 **Expected outputs:**

- 527 • Longitudinal datasets on viral circulation
 - 528 • Characterization of wildlife reservoirs and transmission pathways
 - 529 • Insights into ecological and seasonal drivers of filovirus emergence
 - 530 • Data to inform predictive models and risk assessment
- 531

532 **Long-Term Priorities (+5 years)**

533 Data generated through integrated surveillance should feed directly into predictive models and
534 public health decision-making processes. The objective is to transform filovirus ecology
535 research into an operational tool for anticipation, preparedness, and risk mitigation rather than
536 post-outbreak response alone.

537 **Milestones:**

- 538 1. Integration of surveillance data into predictive models for outbreak anticipation.
- 539 2. Development of decision-support systems for public health authorities.
- 540 3. Full operationalization of the EWS with continuous data streams, automated alerts, and
541 real-time risk assessment.
- 542 4. Translation of research outputs into evidence-based preparedness and response
543 strategies.

544 **Expected outputs:**

- 545 • Operational predictive modelling platforms
 - 546 • Decision-support tools for public health
 - 547 • Evidence-based outbreak mitigation strategies
- 548

549 Diagnostic

550 1. Thematic and state of knowledge

551 Currently, diagnosis relies on a combination of direct detection of the virus using molecular and
 552 antigenic methods, as well as indirect detection through serological methods, with an emphasis
 553 on point-of-care (POC) tools deployable in higher risk areas of sub-Saharan Africa. The tests
 554 are classified as BSL-4 for initial handling due to the high risk, but inactivation protocols allow
 555 processing under BSL-2 conditions. According to WHO guidelines (updated December 2024),
 556 confirmation is based on blood, serum or plasma samples (collected on EDTA) as well as oral
 557 swabs on deceased patients. While assays have been developed for EBOV or MARV allowing
 558 quick characterization, gaps remain for neglected filoviruses and for early detection before
 559 symptom onset. (33–40)

Axe	Description and examples	key challenges
Molecular detection	Methods based on viral RNA, the standard for early and quantitative detection (viral load). High sensitivity).(41) Real-time RT-PCR (RT-qPCR) e.g., RealStar Filovirus Screen RT-PCR Kit detects EBOV, SUDV, BDBV, TAFV, RESTV and MARV in <2 hours).	Issues: genetic variability of viruses, need for specialized equipment (thermocyclers).(42–45) Costs, maintenance and specific environment requirements
Antigen assay	Rapid tests for viral antigens (NP, VP40, GP) in blood or oral swabs (including from cadavers).(39,46) Lateral flow assays (LFAs) such as the ReEBOV Antigen Rapid Test (EUA 2015 for EBOV).	Specificity >99%, but lower sensitivity in the late phase. Limited availability for MARV and other filoviruses.(47,48)
Serological detection	Antibody detection (IgM for the acute phase, IgG for epidemiological surveillance). Useful during the convalescent phase or serosurveys in human/wild animals during interepidemic periods, or investigations involving survivors.(49–51) Capture IgM/IgG ELISA (e.g., kits for EBOV).	Limitations: temporal window (IgM detectable after 5–7 days), false positives in areas with outbreak history.(52)
Advanced and integrated methods	Integration of technologies for multiplexing on point-of-care (POC) (GeneXpert, Biofire, ...) or with high throughput, integrating serology on Luminex or MSD platforms or NGS.(50,51,53) with tangible impact on public health response; microarray for 16 haemorrhagic pathogens...(54)	Cost, requirement for BSL-3/4 facilities, maintenance, supply chain

560 2. Key Findings, Emerging Trends, and Data Gap

561 Filovirus diagnostics have made significant advances in recent years, aiming to make tools
 562 faster, decentralized, and suitable for field settings, although many gaps remain.

563 RT-qPCR remains the reference method for confirming infections with orthoebolaviruses and
 564 orthomarburgvirus, due to its high sensitivity and proven field use, notably in mobile
 565 laboratories and through inactivation protocols that allow sample processing at BSL-2.(55)

566 Existing platforms rely on (i) open PCR platforms and (ii) semi-automated closed PCR
567 platforms. While the open PCR are less costly, they might be more complicated to decentralize
568 closer to field as opposed to semi-automated closed PCR platforms that can be decentralized
569 more easily despite the cost and the need to make it available for most filoviruses. (43,56). In
570 addition, waste management challenges are not always anticipated in remote areas.

571 Rapid antigen tests based on lateral flow immunoassays show high specificity but variable
572 sensitivity, often insufficient for routine use, and no rapid test has yet achieved regulatory
573 approval for filoviruses (39,46) (57) Furthermore, genomic surveillance and viral sequencing
574 (NGS and RNA seq) have become essential for monitoring virus evolution, pathogen discovery,
575 understanding transmission chains, and detecting new strains, but sequencing capacity still
576 needs to be improved and sustained in high risk countries despite progress with the COVID-19
577 pandemic (58–60). Serological tests, particularly IgM and IgG, remain poorly standardized and
578 difficult to interpret, although they are essential for epidemiology and detection of past cases
579 often missed.

580 Innovative technologies such as CRISPR/Cas biosensors and isothermal LAMP tests offer
581 strong potential for portable and rapid diagnostics suitable for rural or low-resource settings,
582 but they still require rigorous clinical validation and protocol standardization.

583 Gaps

584 The absence of standardized sample banks, low tool interoperability, lack of sustainable
585 funding, and loss of capacity between outbreaks compromises epidemic preparedness. These
586 gaps lead to delays in case detection, potential silent transmission, incomplete epidemiological
587 monitoring, and late deployment of control measures such as contact tracing and ring
588 vaccination where relevant, highlighting the urgent need to develop reliable rapid tests,
589 molecular biology and sequencing infrastructure, and robust validation strategies to improve
590 filovirus surveillance and outbreak management.(61) Another critical point concerns less-
591 studied filoviruses: most existing diagnostic tests focus on EBOV, SUDV, and MARV, and there
592 are few or no validated diagnostics for other emerging filoviruses, creating a risk of delayed
593 detection and limiting effective epidemiological surveillance(55). In addition, filovirus
594 sequencing remains expensive, and targeted NGS syndromic approaches should be developed
595 to allow rapid early characterization. Finally, the trust in patients/ communities has emerged
596 across epidemics as a challenge, particularly with novel approaches and may need to be
597 addressed to allow early and reliable detection of the viruses in the community.

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3. Operational Assets

Resource / Platform	Geographical scope	Key capabilities	Emergency response	Optimal effectiveness contexts
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN)	Global	Mobilization of experts, laboratory teams, logistics, deployment of mobile labs	Activation via WHO within 48–72 hours; multi-agency coordination; support for regulatory compliance	Early outbreak phase; countries with limited capacity; multi-country hotspots
Africa CDC – Pathogen Genomics Initiative (PGI)	Africa (West, Central, East, Southern hubs)	Genomic sequencing, bioinformatics, variant monitoring, standardized pipelines	Transport of inactivated samples to reference labs; activation of bioinformatics networks	DRC, Guinea, Uganda, Sierra Leone; inter-epidemic genomic surveillance
GeneXpert TB/HIV Network	Africa, Asia, Latin America	Decentralized rapid PCR testing; existing modules in primary healthcare centers	Emergency supply of Ebola cartridges; integration into national diagnostic algorithms	Rural and remote areas; rapid confirmation without new infrastructure
FIND (Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics)	Global	Independent evaluation; analytical and clinical validation; support to manufacturers	Accelerated evaluation of PCR/LAMP/Ag-RDT; support for WHO EUL submission	Validation during inter-epidemic periods; controlled introduction of new diagnostics
WHO Emergency Use Listing (EUL)	Global	Accelerated regulatory pathway enabling procurement by UN agencies	Pre-submission dossier preparation; expedited review; post-market surveillance	Rapid large-scale deployment; procurement via UNICEF/UNOPS
Go.Data (WHO)	Africa, Asia, South America	Case and contact management; integration of lab data; real-time analytics	Integration of PCR/Ag-RDT data; rapid staff training; interoperability with DHIS2	Field operations; transmission chain monitoring
Mobile laboratories (MSF, EU, CDC)	Globally deployable	On-site PCR diagnostics; mobile BSL-3 modules; rapid staff training	Deployment within 24–72 hours; setup in low-infrastructure areas	Rural epicenters; limited hospital capacity; hard-to-reach settings
National/Regional Sample Banks / MOHS–UKHSA Ebola Biobank	Endemic countries + WHO networks	Reference standards; validation panels; access to inactivated samples	Secure storage; sharing via MTAs; support for inter-laboratory validation	Inter-laboratory standardization; EQA; inter-epidemic validation
ECOWAS / Africa CDC – Logistics Hubs	West Africa / Pan-African	Supply chain management; stockpiling; cross-border distribution	Activation of regional stockpiles; delivery of reagents; deployment of mobile teams	Cross-border outbreaks; supply chain disruptions
ARTIC Network	Global	Real-time viral genome sequencing; standardized protocols and primer schemes	Provision of primers, protocols, training, technical support	Outbreak response; field NGS deployment; preparedness
ZOO-SURSY Project	West, Central, East, Southern Africa	Strengthening zoonotic surveillance; early detection; wildlife investigations	Capacity building; field investigations; training	Inter-epidemic surveillance; One Health preparedness
East African Community (EAC) Mobile Laboratory Network	East Africa	PCR/qPCR/ELISA diagnostics; mobile BSL-2/3 labs; genomic surveillance; training	Rapid deployment of mobile labs for detection and response	Remote, resource-limited settings; cross-border surveillance; high-risk One Health environments

604

605

4. Key challenges

606 The effective implementation of research and diagnostic efforts for orthoebolaviruses and
607 orthomareburgviruses faces multiple barriers, particularly in resource-limited settings or during
608 outbreaks. Infrastructural and logistical challenges include the limited availability of
609 laboratories equipped and certified to handle highly infectious samples, as safe sample
610 manipulation requires BSL-3 or BSL-4 facilities, biosafety cabinets, and specialized equipment,
611 which are often lacking in at-risk countries (59). Sample transport and storage requirements
612 further complicate operations, with strict mandates for low-temperature storage, triple
613 packaging, and compliance with international regulations. On the human and organizational
614 side, shortages of trained and experienced personnel, coupled with the need to maintain
615 biosafety and adhere to standard operating procedures, constrain the rapid expansion of

616 diagnostic capacity, even with the deployment of mobile or semi-automated laboratories (62–
617 64).

618 Genomic approaches, such as next-generation sequencing (NGS), are essential for rapid
619 characterization of viral strains (65), monitoring of mutations (66) and guiding the development
620 and deployment of molecular diagnostics, therapeutic and vaccines. However, access to
621 sequencing platforms, high costs, lack of trained bioinformaticians, and limited computational
622 infrastructure often hinder the timely use of NGS during outbreaks. In addition, during an
623 outbreak, they should be considered alongside epidemiological data which are not always easier
624 to gather on time (67,68). Furthermore, delays in data sharing, ethical concerns, and regulatory
625 barriers may prevent genomic information from being rapidly disseminated and integrated into
626 public health responses (59,69,70)

627 Limited availability of clinical samples, particularly during the early stages of outbreaks, further
628 hampers assay validation and the development of rapid diagnostic tools. Rapid antigen-
629 detection tests (Ag-RDTs), while potentially useful for point-of-care screening, face additional
630 limitations including lower sensitivity compared with RT-PCR, variable performance in field
631 conditions, and insufficient data for newly emerging species, complicating their interpretation
632 and implementation (71,72). Moreover, the development pipeline for filovirus Ag-RDTs
633 remains extremely limited because the market is considered unprofitable by most
634 manufacturers, who face high development and regulatory costs with little commercial return,
635 resulting in very few companies willing to invest in such diagnostics (33,40). Social and
636 dynamics also play a key role: fear of infection, stigma, mistrust of authorities and external
637 medical research, or reluctance to undergo testing can reduce sample availability and delay
638 diagnosis, ultimately impeding outbreak containment (73,74).

639 Finally, regulatory, financial, and data-sharing constraints can delay research efforts and the
640 uptake of new diagnostics, while ongoing security issues or political instability in outbreak
641 regions may further impede both laboratory operations and field investigations (59,73,75)

642 **5. Strategic Objectives**

643 **Short-Term Priorities (0–12 months)** - Focus: Rapid deliverables, feasibility assessments, and
644 foundational systems.

- 645 • The operationalization of below priorities should integrate primarily national and
646 regional laboratories of areas at higher risk, as they urgently need to be equipped for
647 baseline diagnostic with available tools and their relative biosafety materials, and
648 standardized SOPs. Therefore, formalized national diagnostic algorithms tailored to
649 local operational realities and integrated within regional reference laboratory networks
650 will not only be developed but also ensure high impact research.
 - 651 ⇒ These frameworks standardize testing strategies, improve equitable access to
652 diagnostics across different regions, and optimize the use of specialized
653 laboratories
- 654 • Improve surveillance in remote areas at risk by integrating innovative approaches such
655 as AI to enhance data collection and/or to empower the yield of current diagnostic

656 (serological, PCR and sequencing panels targeting all known filovirus in humans,
657 animals and environment)

658 ⇒ To allow accurate data collection and narrow laboratory syndromic diagnosis
659 and to ensure immediate minimum detection capacity and reduce reliance on
660 external laboratories during early outbreak phases.

661 • **Launch community-engagement frameworks** through participatory design and
662 social-science assessments.

663 ⇒ *This increases community trust and prevents resistance to testing when*
664 *outbreaks occur.*

665 • **Develop and validate simplified sampling tools** such as dried blood spots, ambient-
666 temperature swabs, inactivation buffers for both human and animals, as well as **low-**
667 **cost POC assays** PCR, LAMP/CRISPR assays, Ag-RDTs, sequencing approaches in
668 open platforms

669 ⇒ *These tools expand diagnostic reach to remote settings and reduce logistics*
670 *costs.*

671 • **Establish rapid data-sharing agreements** across ministries, research institutions, and
672 global partners.

673 ⇒ *identify reticence factors and accompanying countries because fast*
674 *information flow accelerates detection of transmission patterns, and the*
675 *epidemics response by facilitating therapeutic and vaccination. This should be*
676 *built on previous developed pre-agreement and procedures.*

677 • **Develop harmonized regulatory pathways** to fast-track approval of diagnostic tools
678 during outbreaks

679 ⇒ *Streamlined regulation shortens deployment timelines for essential tests.*

680 **Medium-Term Priorities (1–3 years)**

681 Focus: Validated outputs, field-ready tools, operational platforms.

682 • **Validate multiplex PCR assays and next-generation sequencing tools** using
683 standardized biobank samples

684 ⇒ *This improves diagnostic accuracy, fills gaps for filovirus species lacking*
685 *assays, and enhances animal surveillance and virus ecology studies, enabling*
686 *rapid species identification to activate appropriate care pathways and*
687 *accelerate the launch of therapeutic trials.*

688
689 • **Enhance and expand multiplex serology platforms's targets to cover the broad**
690 **family of filoviruses in both human, animal and environmental samples**

691
692 ⇒ *This enhances virus ecology studies and surveillance by detecting past exposure,*
693 *informing vaccination strategies, and supporting evaluation of protective*

694 *immunity in populations, enabling targeted public health interventions and*
695 *rapid response planning.*

696 • **Deploy decentralized diagnostic and sequencing platforms;** portable PCR,
697 LAMP/CRISPR assays, Ag-RDTs, to rural clinics and mobile units.
698 *to rural clinics and mobile units, integrating non-invasive, low-risk methods suitable for safe*
699 *use even in post-mortem settings. Attention should also be paid to developing thermostable,*
700 *long-shelf life assays for such decentralized use.*

701 • Develop POC approaches for patient biological follow-up and identify earlier
702 biomarkers that could suggest infection
703 ⇨ *physiopathological and modelling studies may help to draw profiles for early*
704 *detection, and even in emonctory organs where the virus is latent or when virus*
705 *detection is challenging*

706 • Develop models for sustainable national diagnostic systems including training,
707 equipment, and long-term support
708 ⇨ *this will allow countries that may be newly affected and anticipate any global*
709 *spread*

710 • **Create a networked, ethically governed biobanking system with early-outbreak**
711 **sample-sharing agreements.**
712 ⇨ *A stable sample supply allows rapid test validation (diagnostics, treatment,*
713 *vaccine) and supports local research capacity. Building collaboration and*
714 *regular assessments or exercises with these biobanks should be prioritized*
715

716 • **Implement genomic surveillance tools, guidelines and pipelines,** with routine
717 sequencing, bioinformatics training, and integration into outbreak dashboards.
718 ⇨ *Genomic data enables early identification of pathogen, transmission hotspots.*
719 *This also allows better understanding of outbreak dynamics, zoonotic origin,*
720 *diagnosis ajustment and countermeasures developement*
721

722 • **Scale community-engaged testing pilots** involving local health workers and civil-
723 society partners.
724 ⇨ *Locally anchored approaches improve participation, reduce stigma, and*
725 *increase uptake.*
726

727 • **Operationalize regional logistics systems** with pooled procurement, reagent
728 stockpiles, and rapid deployment teams.
729 ⇨ *Stronger supply chains minimize stock outs and improve preparedness for surges*
730 *in demand.*
731

732 **Launch regular EQA proficiency test** enrolling laboratories with those located in
733 higher risk area in priority.
734 ⇨ *This will allow to keep level of awareness and preparedness during*
735 *interepidemic periods*
736

737 **Long-Term Priorities (3+ years)**

738 Focus: System integration, policy adoption, and sustainable scale-up.

- 739
- 740 • **Integrate validated diagnostics into national surveillance programs**, including
741 routine testing in health facilities, cross-border monitoring, and One-Health
742 animal/human systems.
743 ⇒ *Integration of diagnosis into routine surveillance promotes early detection and
coordination of control measures at the regional level.*

 - 744 • **Establish sustained financing mechanisms**; regional manufacturing partnerships,
745 advanced market commitments, or donor-supported procurement lines, to guarantee
746 long-term access to diagnostics.
747 ⇒ *Stable financing guarantees long-term availability and reduces dependence on
748 emergency funding.*

 - 749 • **Embed social and behavioral science approaches into diagnostic policy and
750 workforce training.**
751 ⇒ Addressing behavioral drivers improves acceptance, informed consent, and
752 testing adherence.
753

 - 754 • **Evaluate long-term impact** and refine policies to ensure equitable diagnostic access
755 across regions and population groups.
756 ⇒ *Continuous evaluation supports evidence-based policy improvements and
757 reduces inequities. In addition, survivors continued follow –up and serological
758 surveys to assess population susceptibility or protection should be considered.*
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773 **Physiopathology and Disease Models**

774 **1. Thematic and state of knowledge**

775 Current knowledge on filovirus pathogenesis indicates that infection begins at mucosal surfaces
776 or through skin breaches, where macrophages and dendritic cells serve as initial targets and
777 subsequently disseminate the virus to lymph nodes and major organs(76). Disease progression
778 is driven by uncontrolled viral replication and a strong yet ineffective inflammatory
779 response(77), shaped by well-characterized immune-evasion strategies: VP35 suppresses
780 RIG-I-mediated interferon induction, orthoebolaviruse VP24 and orthomarburgviruse VP40
781 block STAT1 nuclear import, and the GP glycoprotein disrupts tetherin activity and cytokine
782 signaling(78).

783 Systemic involvement extends beyond classical hepatic, splenic, and renal injury to include
784 gastrointestinal, pulmonary, and neurological manifestations(76,79), while severe disease is
785 marked by a hemorrhagic syndrome now better characterized through clinical features such as,
786 laboratory biomarkers, and mechanistic insights into vascular leakage and coagulopathy.

787 Viral persistence in survivors, documented in immune-privileged sites such as the eye(80),
788 CNS, and testes as well as organs like the liver and placenta, is increasingly characterized
789 through longitudinal cohorts, targeted sampling, and molecular and immunologic profiling. A
790 diverse array of animal models—including rodents, ferrets, humanized mice, and non-human
791 primates—supports countermeasure evaluation, with NHP intensive-care models now enabling
792 more controlled, clinically relevant studies at least for model pathogens.

793 **2. Key Findings, Emerging Trends, and Data Gap**

794 Recent research has clarified how infection initiates at mucosal or cutaneous entry points,
795 spreads through macrophages and dendritic cells, and progresses to systemic organ involvement
796 accompanied by strong but dysregulated immune responses. Yet determinants of tissue tropism,
797 duration of persistence, and correlates of clearance versus recrudescence remain incompletely
798 understood. However standardized biomarker panels and predictive thresholds remain
799 lacking(81).

800 Filoviral proteins such as VP35, VP24, VP40, and GP are well characterized for their roles in
801 immune evasion, while the diversification of animal models—including ferrets, humanized
802 mice, and collaborative cross strains—complements traditional rodent and non-human primate
803 systems(80,82–84). Complementing these systems, new approach methodologies such as
804 organoids, organ-on-chip platforms, and organotypic cultures incorporating immune
805 components offer human-relevant tools to investigate persistence, immune-privileged tissues,
806 survivor outcomes, and patient-specific responses, strengthening the bridge between
807 mechanistic insights and clinical translation. This system will also help avoiding the systematic
808 use of animal models(85–87).

809 Also, the field still lacks an animal model that reliably recapitulates either long-term viral
810 persistence or episodes of recrudescence since actual models are 100% lethal. These two issues
811 are deeply intertwined, without a model capable of maintaining low-level infection over time,
812 it remains difficult to study the mechanisms that trigger viral reactivation. Extending follow-up
813 of surviving animals in high-containment facilities may eventually reveal such models, but this
814 approach is logistically demanding, which reinforced the value of developing organoid and
815 microphysiological systems specifically tailored to immune-privileged sites such as the eye,
816 CNS, and testes.

817 Alongside this central gap, additional research needs persist, including the development of
818 robust tools for neglected filoviruses (Sudan, Bundibugyo, Taï Forest, and Ravn viruses),
819 clarification of the cytokine programs and cell types that distinguish survival from severe
820 disease, identification of transcriptional and chromatin regulators shaping host responses,
821 improved understanding of early disease stages including incubation and initial immune
822 sensing, and deeper exploration of co-infections and their impact on disease severity and
823 treatment outcomes.

824 **3. Operational Assets**

825 Across high-containment networks worldwide, substantial capacity exists to study filoviruses.
826 Yet, critical gaps remain in how these infrastructures connect and translate findings into
827 actionable countermeasures. In Europe, BSL-4 laboratories in France(88), Italy, Hungary, and
828 Sweden— members of ERINHA, the EU research infrastructure dedicated to the study of risk
829 group 4 (RG4) pathogens —combine advanced omics, standardized SOPs, and a broad range
830 of animal and translational models(89), while the UK contributes deep experience with RG4
831 pathogens and persistence studies. The United States adds large-scale analytical pipelines,
832 CRISPR-based perturbation platforms, spatial multi-omics, and multiple NHP-capable BSL-4
833 facilities, Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory integrates CL-3/CL-4 research with
834 deployable outbreak response units and Australia’s CSIRO further strengthens global BSL-4
835 capacity, while initiatives such as the Global BioLabs database, WHO Collaborating Centres,
836 and GOARN offer coordination, training, and surge support.

837 Africa provides the essential clinical anchor: survivor cohorts(90), national reference
838 laboratories(91–94), and regional biobanks generate the longitudinal samples and real-time data
839 needed to validate persistence and recrudescence models—resources that no high-containment
840 laboratory can produce alone.

841 Despite this extensive infrastructure, several structural weaknesses persist. The most pressing
842 is the absence of internationally harmonized standards and reference reagents, without which
843 data generated across laboratories remain difficult to compare. Even with aligned SOPs,
844 biological assays require internal standards to control inherent variability, and global stocks of
845 reference materials are limited. The field still lacks reliable models of long-term persistence
846 and recrudescence, a gap that neither current animal models nor short-term high-containment
847 studies fully address. Survivor cohorts and African biobanks partially fill this void, but
848 sustained investment in organoid and microphysiological systems tailored to

849 immune-privileged tissues is needed to complement in vivo work. Finally, global coordination
850 mechanisms—such as WHOAFIRM’s long-term research agenda—exist but remain
851 underutilized, and rapid data-sharing frameworks are still unevenly implemented across
852 regions.

853 **4. Key challenges**

854 Despite major scientific advances, physiopathology and disease models about filovirus still face
855 several structural challenges that limit progress toward fully predictive models and actionable
856 countermeasures. High-containment capacity remains unevenly distributed: while Europe,
857 North America, Australia, and the UK host BSL-4/BSL-3 laboratories equipped with advanced
858 omics and CRISPR platforms, endemic regions like Africa lack equivalent infrastructure,
859 which unable local investigation on persistence, recrudescence, and neglected filoviruses.
860 Logistical barriers further complicate research, as safe collection and transport of high-risk
861 specimens—ocular fluid, semen, CSF—require specialized kits, PPE, and cold-chain systems
862 that are difficult to sustain during outbreaks, making survivor-cohort models hard to scale
863 beyond a few well-supported sites. Regulatory frameworks governing international sample
864 transfer, while essential for biosafety and traceability, often slow the circulation of materials
865 needed for multicenter studies, particularly between endemic countries and reference
866 laboratories. At the same time, data remain fragmented across survivor cohorts, animal models,
867 and organoid systems, with limited harmonization of endpoints or eCRFs, hindering
868 interoperability and slowing translation into outbreak-relevant insights. Scientifically, the field
869 still lacks validated animal models for several filoviruses, and many existing rodent models rely
870 on host-adapted strains whose mutations and pathogenic consequences remain poorly
871 understood. Crucially, no current model reliably reproduces long-term infection or
872 recrudescence in immune-privileged sites, and universally lethal systems fail to capture the
873 heterogeneity of human disease. More tractable, ethically sustainable models—alongside
874 deeper investigation of cytokine programs, co-infections, and gene-regulatory mechanisms—
875 are needed to bridge the gap between experimental systems and the complex physiopathology
876 observed in patients.

877 **5. Strategic Objectives**

878 **Short term (0–12 months) — priorities and deliverables**

- 879 - **Set up coordination:** Identify and connect existing labs, survivor cohorts, and networks
- 880 - Define a minimal common framework for animal studies: Finalize basic ethical
881 approvals and develop shared SOP elements (sampling procedures, sample types,
882 storage conditions, metadata requirements) to ensure cross-laboratory comparability
883 without imposing a single harmonised protocol.
- 884 - **Improve collaboration** between clinical researchers and translational scientists
- 885 - Strengthen biomarker mapping
- 886 - Begin standardized collection of clinical and laboratory data to characterize
887 hemorrhagic syndromes (coagulation profiles, endothelial markers) and persistence in
888 survivors (ocular fluid, semen, CSF), to ensure harmonized protocols across sites

- 889 - Prepare ethical pipelines for sample access: Pre negotiate rapid, ethical, and
890 harmonised access pathways for clinical samples and contemporary isolates, including
891 clauses for secondary use in vaccine/therapeutic protocols.
892 - Support and structure local biobanks: Reinforce governance, quality control, and
893 sustainability of African biobanks to ensure availability of high-quality materials
894 during and between outbreaks.

895 **Medium term (1-5 years) priorities and deliverables**

- 896 - **Validate models:** Strengthen animal models and new approach methodologies
897 (organoids, organ-on-chip) to study persistence, recrudescence, and immune
898 dysregulation
899 - **Develop neglected filovirus tools:** Create reagents and models for neglected filovirus
900 (Sudan, Marburg, Tai Forest, Bundibugyo viruses)
901 - **Integrate data systems:** Harmonize clinical, laboratory, and cohort data using shared
902 standards to improve interoperability
903 - **Capacity building:** Train local teams in biosafety, sample handling, and data
904 management; reinforce African reference labs
905 - Advance physiopathologic studies of host response (immune activation, endothelial
906 dysfunction, coagulation cascades) to identify novel therapeutic targets and validate
907 them in translational models
908 - **Cross-validate advanced models with transcriptomics:** Use transcriptomic and
909 spatial multiomics data to validate organoids, organonchip systems, and human tissue
910 studies conducted in highcontainment settings

911 **Long term (+5 years) priorities and deliverables**

- 912 - **Sustain networks:** Maintain standing outbreak-ready platforms linking African clinics
913 with EU/US labs for rapid activation
914 - **Policy and equity frameworks:** Ensure equitable access to reagents, data, and funding;
915 support local manufacturing of kits and reagents
916 - **Predictive tools and interventions-**: Establish standardized biomarker panels and
917 thresholds to predict hemorrhagic progression and persistence risk, enabling early
918 intervention and personalized therapeutic strategies
919 - **Community trust:** Continue survivor follow-up programs with psychosocial support
920 and transparent return of results to reinforce engagement

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924 **Therapeutics**

925 **1. Thematic and state of knowledge**

926 Current antiviral strategies against filoviruses span monoclonal antibodies, small-molecule
927 antivirals, combination regimens, host-directed therapies, and optimized supportive care, yet
928 major gaps remain across all categories.

929 **Antiviral : Monoclonal Antibodies (mAbs) :**

- 930 • 2 mAbs are FDA-approved for EBOV (**REGN-EB3/Inmazeb** and **mAb114/Ebanga**)
931 (95,96)
- 932 • **MBP134** is in development for SUDV. Although, in nonclinical studies, **MBP134** has
933 been shown to **bind to the glycoproteins of multiple Orthoebolaviruses** and to **confer**
934 **protective efficacy** in several animal models, including **EVD, SVD, and BDBV**
935 **disease**. It was not developed for EBOV given the availability of already approved
936 treatments.
- 937 • **MBP091** is the lead candidate for MARV, tested in animal models. **MBP091** was **made**
938 **available and used** under the **PARTNERS** trial framework in Rwanda, in 2024 during
939 the MARV outbreak
- 940 • **Despite progress, no “pan-filovirus” antibody exists, and cross-species coverage**
941 **remains incomplete.**

942 **Classical antivirals (small molecules):**

- 943 • **Remdesivir** is the most advanced candidate, with extensive use in COVID-19 and
944 filovirus outbreaks (including Rwanda 2024). It shows activity in nonhuman primate
945 models and is considered standard of care in some outbreak settings. Its requirement for
946 intravenous administration represents a limitation on remdesivir’s use
- 947 • **Favipiravir** data are, at this stage, weak: oral administration showed no efficacy in a
948 2018 USAMRIID study, while IV formulations demonstrated partial protection against
949 MARV challenge. Dose and formulation remain unresolved. Additional evidence on
950 safety could be drawn from its approved use for influenza (in Japan since 2014), as well
951 as from its emergency or conditional use during COVID-19 in countries such as India,
952 Russia, and Indonesia. These data may help contextualize its safety profile, even though
953 their relevance to filovirus disease remains uncertain.
- 954 • **Obeldesivir** – oral prodrug derived from remdesivir’s parent nucleoside- has shown
955 promise as an oral postexposure prophylaxis in nonhuman primates, with potential
956 applications for both MARV and SUDV but has not been tested for treatment. Given its
957 similarity to remdesivir, its oral route of administration makes it a particularly attractive
958 candidate for further development.

959 **Combination Strategies:** Combination regimens (e.g., remdesivir + monoclonal antibodies)
960 have already been used in the field, but systematic data remains limited.

- 961 • Strong interest in pairing mAbs with small molecules
- 962 • Preclinical synergy observed, but no robust clinical data yet. (97)

- 963 • Safety should be considered as acceptable based on COVID-19 experience combining
964 antivirals and antibodies.

965 **Host-Directed Therapies:**

- 966 • Corticosteroids and sepsis-like interventions have been tested but remain unproven
967 • Retrospective analyses suggest possible benefit from anti-mediator therapies (anti-TNF,
968 anti-IL1, TLR4 antagonists), but evidence is limited.
969 • In addition, early studies of host-directed anticoagulant strategies showed partial
970 protection. For example, the tissue factor pathway inhibitor rNAPc2 achieved
971 approximately 33% survival in a nonhuman primate model of EBOVbola viru infection
972 Subsequent discussions with the license holder suggested that the drug may have been
973 underdosed, as the maximal effective dose had been established in healthy animals
974 rather than in virally challenged models. These findings highlight that modulation of
975 coagulation pathways may have potential but remains insufficiently explored

976 **Supportive Care:** Universally recognized as the backbone of treatment(98).

- 977 • Standardized supportive care reduces case fatality rates dramatically (from >70% to
978 <40%).
979 • WHO guidelines are being updated in 2026 with opportunities to define a research
980 agenda for high-value interventions (fluid resuscitation, renal protection, oxygen
981 delivery, infection control). This context could allow the evaluation of adjunctive
982 interventions—such as the role of corticosteroids or the optimal duration of antiviral
983 therapy—thereby broadening the scope of clinical study.

984 **Trials and Protocols:**

- 985 • The **PREVAIL II** and **PALM** clinical trials provided complementary evidence on
986 therapeutic approaches against EVD:
987 o **PREVAIL II:** ZMapp + optimized standard of care (pSOC) vs standard of care
988 alone (oSOC). Mortality reduced to 22% vs 37%, with 91% likelihood ZMapp
989 was superior
990 o **PALM:** ZMapp used as the anchor arm. Mortality was reduced in
991 the Inmazeb (**REGNEB3**) and Ebanga (**mAb114**) arms relative to ZMapp;
992 remdesivir showed comparable outcomes to ZMapp before its arm
993 was discontinued(99)
994 • **PARTNERS** Protocols provide a single adaptive, multi-arm platform trial framework
995 across filoviruses (EBOV, SUDV, MARV). This design allows simultaneous testing of
996 multiple candidates, harmonization across countries, and pooling of data across
997 outbreaks.

998 **Placebo**-controlled designs should be reconsidered in some filovirus outbreaks, particularly in
999 cases where a licensed treatment is available. In the **PARTNERS** framework, patients with
1000 **EBOV** systematically receive monoclonal antibodies, whereas in non-EVD outbreaks, a small
1001 proportion of participants may be randomised to receive optimised supportive care alone if all
1002 control allocations align. However, the acceptability of SoC-only arms varies by country and
1003 may pose operational challenges for trial implementation, as well as raising ethical issues.

1004 Except for EBOV, randomization arms should always include remdesivir against mAb alone or
1005 in combination with small antiviral molecules.

1006 **2. Key Findings, Emerging Trends, and Data Gap**

1007 **MBP134** and **MBP091** (respectively) are prioritized for SUDV and MARV based on preclinical
1008 data and feasibility. But there is limited clinical efficacy data for SUDV and MARV: no Phase
1009 III evidence is available, and current efficacy signals derive primarily from nonclinical studies
1010 and early phase human safety data. These candidates therefore require confirmation of efficacy
1011 in humans through randomized controlled trials. For **favipiravir**, the evidence remains weak
1012 and inconsistent, particularly regarding dosing and formulation for filoviruses. Additional data
1013 are needed not only for favipiravir but also for other small molecule antivirals, including a better
1014 understanding of how monoclonal antibodies may influence viral persistence and the risk of
1015 relapse(100). Although favipiravir has an established safety record in other indications—such
1016 as influenza (approved by the Japanese regulatory agency in 2014) and its use during COVID19
1017 in countries including India, Russia, and Indonesia—no filovirus-specific safety or efficacy data
1018 exist. Priority should therefore be placed on supporting dose finding studies and generating
1019 clinical evidence in outbreak settings.

1020 **There is still an absence of an universal monoclonal antibody** capable of covering all
1021 filoviruses, leaving significant gaps for both orthoebolaviruses and orthomarburgviruses. To
1022 date, MBP134 is the closest candidate and should be prioritized in all interventional protocols.

1023 **High production costs of monoclonal antibodies**, raising major issues for large scale
1024 manufacturing, sustainable financing, and the need to engage additional funders early in the
1025 process. This also raises the broader question of whether developing new mAbs is realistic
1026 without parallel work on affordability and access models.

1027 **Combination therapies:** Preclinical evidence for synergy is extremely limited, with only one
1028 study evaluating a variant of MBP134 in combination with remdesivir and no available data for
1029 MBP091. While experience from COVID-19 suggests that mAb–antiviral combinations can be
1030 well tolerated, no filovirus specific safety data exist to date. Observational data from settings
1031 where such combinations have been used (e.g., Rwanda) may provide additional insights, but
1032 systematic evaluation of dosing, timing, and safety in outbreak conditions remains lacking.

1033 **Position of remdesivir:** In the event of future outbreaks of EBOV, remdesivir should now
1034 probably be considered the standard, and future trials should be based on this assumption (no
1035 randomization arm without offering remdesivir). Key uncertainties remain, including **optimal**
1036 **treatment duration** and whether these questions **require formal clinical evaluation. Safety**
1037 **has been extensively assessed in COVID-19 era.**

1038 **Regulatory and operational constraints continue to slow trial initiation.** Maintaining
1039 operational African partners between outbreaks is essential to ensure readiness. Launching a
1040 trial at the first detected cases remains challenging due to PI availability, regulatory approvals,
1041 and logistics. “Expanded access” protocols have been valuable for generating safety data and
1042 may remain an important tool.

1043 **Community engagement must be immediate** and embedded from the very start of the trial.
1044 Engagement should focus on dialogue around uncertainties, not only on building trust.

1045 **Post trial access** must be planned in parallel with trial implementation, not as a downstream
1046 activity. This includes anticipating procurement pathways, financing, and regulatory alignment

1047 **3. Operational Assets**

1048 Several existing projects, platforms, and networks established during past filovirus outbreaks
1049 could be rapidly leveraged or scaled to accelerate clinical research and access to
1050 countermeasures. For example, the PALM trial infrastructure—comprising sites and teams
1051 trained in IV monoclonal antibody stockage, reconstitution and delivery, harmonized SOPs,
1052 real-time data capture systems, and safety procedures—remains a key asset in the DRC and can
1053 be reactivated quickly for EBOV. It also provides a practical mentorship hub to transfer
1054 operational expertise to SUDV and MARV trial sites. The PARTNERS protocol, already
1055 approved and activated in Rwanda during the 2024 MARV outbreak (with around 10 patients
1056 enrolled), and submitted in Tanzania and the DRC, offers a ready-to-deploy therapeutic research
1057 platform.

1058 Regional research hubs such as INRB (DRC), Makerere University (Uganda), and several
1059 National Public Health Institutes across West and East Africa provide PCR capacity, cold chain
1060 and pharmacy staging, community engagement teams, and established regulatory pathways.
1061 WHO and Africa CDC further support regulatory facilitation, technical guidance, and
1062 crossborder logistics coordination.

1063 However, persistent gaps—outdated guidelines, limited regulatory capacity, and coordination
1064 between ethics committees and regulatory authorities, insufficient funding, lack of trained PI
1065 identification and fragile site infrastructure—still constrain the rapid and interoperable
1066 deployment of these assets during emergencies.

1067 **4. Key challenges**

1068 Filovirus therapeutics continue to face structural challenges that slow progress from discovery
1069 to real-world impact. Outbreaks remain unpredictable and often too short to support adequately
1070 powered trials, while site readiness and regulatory activation still vary widely across countries,
1071 which create delays. Ethics and approval processes—though necessary—remain a major
1072 bottleneck and underscore the need for earlier engagement with regional regulatory bodies such
1073 as AVAREF or AMRH to streamline protocol review. Community engagement adds another
1074 layer of complexity: rather than aiming for full trust, which is rarely achievable in emergency
1075 contexts, the priority is to build durable channels for dialogue that allow concerns to be raised
1076 transparently and support participation without coercion before or in between the occurrence of
1077 outbreaks.

1078 Scientifically, the evidence base remains thin: combination therapies are underexplored,
1079 favipiravir requires dose-finding, and efficacy data and both small molecules and monoclonal
1080 antibodies carry risks of viral escape, persistence, or relapse. Treatment duration is still not
1081 assessed and specified. Species-specific differences continue to limit translatability, reinforcing

1082 the need for host-directed approaches and for evaluating promising candidates such as
1083 obeldesivir in therapeutic—not only prophylactic—settings, including among children and
1084 pregnant women.

1085 Finally, access remains a persistent barrier: high production costs, cold-chain requirements, and
1086 the absence of post-trial access pathways restrict the deployment of mAbs and IV antivirals in
1087 the very settings where they are most needed. Ensuring equitable access will require planning
1088 for manufacturing, PK/PD studies and early completion of developmental and reproductive
1089 (DART) studies,, and regulatory pathways *before* large trials begin, not after efficacy results
1090 emerge.

1091 **5. Strategic Objectives**

1092 **Short term (0–12 months) — priorities and deliverables**

- 1093 • Move from protocol readiness to active enrollment by early planning and implantation
1094 activities
- 1095 • Set up annexes, ethics approvals, PI identification and logistics (including pharmacy)
1096 for MARV and SUDV by leveraging existing work—such as previously approved
1097 PARTNERS protocols, established trial sites, and regional regulatory networks—so that
1098 trials can be activated immediately when the next outbreak occurs
- 1099 • Secure supply chains: Preposition MBP091 and MBP 134 and remdesivir in
1100 outbreakprone regions
- 1101 • Strengthen supportive care bundles (fluids, oxygen, IPC) to reduce mortality while
1102 therapeutics are tested
- 1103 • **Integrate access considerations upfront to ensure** that pathways for availability,
1104 delivery, and affordability are planned from the beginning rather than addressed only at
1105 the end of trials
- 1106 • Deploy strong, early community engagement strategies, not only to support ethical
1107 practice but to ensure rapid presentation to care, which is essential for therapeutic
1108 efficacy (as demonstrated in the PALM trial). Engagement should: be co designed with
1109 communities, be implemented immediately alongside trial rollout, clearly communicate
1110 the purpose and benefits of research, counter fears and misconceptions, be adequately
1111 budgeted and prepared in advance.
- 1112 • **Engage governmental, regulatory, and institutional authorities** at local, national,
1113 and regional levels to strengthen trust, alignment, and legitimacy across the full
1114 ecosystem of actors—not only community groups.
- 1115 • **Build and mobilize incountry social science capacity**, drawing on existing networks
1116 including local academic network to ensure rapid, crosscutting support across trials and
1117 therapeutic landscapes, rather than relying on a single social scientist per study.

1118 **Medium term (1-5 years) priorities and deliverables**

- 1119 • Generate and consolidate clinical evidence across outbreaks in all populations including
1120 children and women in child-bearing age or pregnant and lactating women.

- 1121 • Emphasize the development of panfilovirus molecules(remdesivir, obeldesivir, 1122 MBP134) and strategies including combinations.
- 1123 • Support cohorts of treated patients to evaluate the impact of treatments and host-directed 1124 therapies on viral persistence and relapse prevention.
- 1125 • **Expand trial networks:** Scale beyond anchor sites (DRC, Uganda, Rwanda...) 1126 to additional national institutes with lab, pharmacies, and cold chain capacity
- 1127 • Negotiate supply and affordability pathways for mAbs and antivirals
- 1128 • **Continue strengthening national regulatory and ethics capacity**, ensuring rapid, 1129 high quality review processes and trust generating oversight

1130 **Long term (+5 years) priorities and deliverables**

- 1131 • Validated therapeutics integrated into WHO and national guidelines
- 1132 • Therapeutic stockpiles incorporated in every at risk country
- 1133 • **Broader therapeutic classes** (host directed therapies, new antivirals) added once core 1134 candidates are validated

1135 **Vaccine**

1136 **1. Thematic and state of knowledge**

1137 **Clinical development pathways and evaluation platforms**

1138 Vaccine development for filoviruses is an area of active research and important progress, but 1139 with significant gaps that still exist. Key progress relates to the licensure of two EBOV vaccines 1140 : the single-dose recombinant VSV-based vaccine (ERVEBO, rVSVΔG-ZEBOV-GP) and the 1141 two-dose heterologous vaccine regimen consisting on an Adenovirus 26 recombinant vaccine 1142 administered as dose one (Zabdeno, Ad26.ZEBOV), followed by a Modified Vaccinia Ankara 1143 recombinant vaccine administered as dose two (Mvabea, MVA-BN-Filo). Both products were 1144 licensed and received WHO prequalification. However, following the discontinuation of 1145 manufacturing of the Ad26.ZEBOV and MVA-BN-Filo regimen when the developer chose to 1146 exit the vaccine space, ERVEBO is currently the only EBOV vaccine widely available. Reliance 1147 on a single vaccine supplier represents a potential vulnerability for global preparedness and 1148 outbreak response and underscores the need to advance additional EBOV vaccine candidates 1149 toward licensure.

1150 In contrast to EBOV, vaccine candidates targeting other filoviruses, such as SUDV and MARV, 1151 remain at early to intermediate stages of clinical development. However, regulatory experience 1152 gained through EBOV vaccine licensure, across multiple development and approval pathways, 1153 provides established approaches that can be leveraged, including immunobridging strategies, to 1154 support the clinical development and licensure of vaccines targeting these two filoviruses.

1155 **Protective immune mechanisms and correlates of protection**

1156 Filovirus vaccine development is constrained by an incomplete understanding of the immune 1157 mechanisms that confer protection and the immune parameters that best predict vaccine 1158 efficacy. In particular, it remains unclear whether survival from filovirus disease induces

1159 protection against subsequent infection with the same filovirus and, if so, how durable such
1160 protective immunity is. Defining whether glycoprotein (GP)-specific IgG titers can serve as a
1161 reliable proxy for long-term vaccine efficacy, or whether functional immune assays are
1162 required, is therefore a critical challenge.

1163 The demonstrated clinical success of passive immunotherapy confirms that antibodies can
1164 mediate protection against filovirus infection, as specialized cocktails of anti-filovirus
1165 monoclonal antibodies are known to be effective. However, this does not resolve whether
1166 immunoassays focused solely on antibody quantity, or even on defined functional profiles, are
1167 sufficient to establish a robust and measurable correlate of protection. Moreover, it remains
1168 uncertain whether a single correlate of protection can be applied across all filoviruses or
1169 whether distinct viruses impose unique immunological requirements. Antibody cross-reactivity
1170 between GPs of different filoviruses further complicates the identification of specific immune
1171 readouts suitable for use as correlates of protection.

1172 Evidence from both clinical and preclinical studies illustrates this complexity. Dose-ranging
1173 nonhuman primate studies of the licensed rVSV Δ G-ZEBOV-GP vaccine demonstrate that
1174 EBOV-specific IgG and neutralizing antibodies correlate with protection across a wide range
1175 of vaccine doses, supporting a central role for humoral immunity. However, these studies have
1176 not defined a robust, prospectively validated protective threshold, despite exploratory post hoc
1177 modeling of antibody cutoffs. In humans, early-phase clinical studies of a bivalent ChAdOx1
1178 EBOV-SUDV vaccine have reported induction of binding antibodies, while neutralizing
1179 responses to SUDV were limited. However, **clinical efficacy has not yet been demonstrated**,
1180 and these immunogenicity findings **should not be directly compared** with protection/correlate
1181 data derived from Ervebo NHP studies. Despite an incomplete understanding of the
1182 mechanisms of protection for MARV vaccines, evidence from preclinical studies suggest that
1183 the level of anti-GP IgG is a better predictor of survival against lethal challenge than
1184 neutralizing activity, as observed for VSV based and recombinant GP based vaccines, which
1185 aligns with the ability of the non-neutralizing mAb MR228 to confer protection after passive
1186 transfer in mice and guinea pigs.

1187 Beyond humoral immunity, analyses from a phase 2 trial of the Ad26.ZEBOV and MVA-BN-
1188 Filo regimen indicate that Ebola vaccination induces durable EBOV-specific CD8⁺ T-cell
1189 responses with proliferative and cytotoxic phenotypes, and that early innate inflammatory
1190 responses are associated with the functional quality of EBOV-specific CD8⁺ T-cell immunity.
1191 Unfortunately, it is not known what role these CD8⁺ T-cells play in the context of efficacy in
1192 humans as relevant clinical data is missing. Collectively, these findings suggest that correlates
1193 of protection for filovirus vaccines are likely multifactorial and filovirus-specific, integrating
1194 quantitative and qualitative antibody features with cellular and innate immune components.
1195 Defining such integrated, functionally relevant correlates remains a critical priority to enable
1196 immunobridging, support multivalent vaccine development, and improve comparability across
1197 platforms and pathogens.

1198 **Durability of vaccine-induced immunity and immune memory**

1199 The persistence of vaccine-induced protection remains a central scientific priority. Nonhuman
1200 primate studies of the licensed rVSVΔG-ZEBOV-GP vaccine provide important insights into
1201 the durability of vaccine-induced immunity. Although vaccination induces robust and sustained
1202 ZEBOV-GP-specific IgG and neutralizing antibody responses, protection against lethal EBOV
1203 challenge appears to be time-dependent. High levels of protection are maintained up to
1204 approximately 8 months post-vaccination, whereas a reduction is observed around 12 months,
1205 despite persistence of measurable antibody titers. These findings suggest that circulating
1206 antibodies alone may be insufficient to ensure long-term protection and underscore the need to
1207 better characterize immune waning kinetics and qualitative immune attributes.

1208 Recent nonhuman primate studies of a VSV-based Sudan virus (SUDV) vaccine further
1209 highlight the complexity of durability across filoviruses. A single-dose VSV-SUDV vaccine
1210 confers rapid protection against lethal SUDV challenge, whereas an EBOV-based VSV vaccine
1211 elicits cross-reactive antibodies without protection, underscoring the limitations of cross-
1212 reactivity and the need for species-specific vaccines and related species-specific assays
1213 supporting development. These observations furthermore highlight complications in
1214 development of multivalent filovirus vaccines or vaccination strategies eliciting multivalent
1215 efficacy profiles using several monovalent vaccines. Modelling analyses from the PREVAC
1216 phase 2 trial show that EBOV vaccine-induced antibody responses wane to some extent over
1217 time, with platform-specific kinetics and a slower decline following rVSVΔG-ZEBOV-GP
1218 vaccination. The PREVAC trial 5-year immunogenicity results for both vaccines in adults and
1219 children will be available in 2026. Antibody persistence varies by age, geography, sex, and
1220 baseline immunity, highlighting the need to better link immune waning with memory recall and
1221 clinical protection to inform booster strategies. Further research is required to establish practical
1222 methods to ensure efficacy in previously vaccinated individuals at imminent risk of exposure
1223 and to address the complex immune profiles in the context of multivalent filovirus vaccination
1224 or exposure.

1225

1226 **2. Key Findings, Emerging Trends, and Data Gap**

1227 Important progress has been achieved in filovirus vaccine development, particularly with the
1228 licensure of EBOV vaccines and the establishment of clinical and regulatory pathways that can
1229 be leveraged for other filoviruses. However, reliance on a single widely available EBOV
1230 vaccine highlights a vulnerability for preparedness and outbreak response.

1231 Vaccine candidates for SUDV and MARV remain at early to intermediate stages of clinical
1232 development, with no licensed products to date. While Phase 1 and 2 studies have generated
1233 immunogenicity data, clinical efficacy has not yet been demonstrated, and licensure-enabling
1234 evidence is lacking.

1235 Current approaches increasingly rely on immunobridging and standardized immunogenicity
1236 assessments, supported by WHO International Standards and global laboratory networks. At
1237 the same time, available evidence indicates that immune protection is complex and likely
1238 involves both humoral and cellular responses.

1239 However, major data gaps remain. There is no validated correlate of protection or defined
1240 immune threshold, and it remains unclear whether antibody responses alone are sufficient to
1241 predict protection. The durability of vaccine-induced immunity is not fully understood, with
1242 evidence suggesting that antibody persistence does not necessarily ensure long-term protection.

1243 Additional uncertainties relate to cross-reactivity and cross-protection between filoviruses,
1244 which complicate the development of multivalent vaccine strategies. Data are also limited for
1245 specific populations, including children, pregnant women, and individuals with comorbidities,
1246 as well as for previously vaccinated individuals at risk of re-exposure.

1247 Finally, operational gaps persist, particularly in access to biological samples and reference
1248 reagents, which remain limited and constrain assay development, standardization, and
1249 comparability across studies.

1250 **3. Operational Assets**

1251 **Clinical trial platforms for outbreak-ready vaccine evaluation**

1252 Several MARV and SUDV vaccine candidates have generated promising Phase 1 data and are
1253 progressing through Phase 2 clinical development, although no vaccines are yet licensed. In
1254 this context, outbreak-capable clinical trial infrastructures represent a critical enabling resource
1255 for timely vaccine evaluation in emergency settings.

1256 The SOLIDARITY trial is a Phase 2/3 cluster-randomized ring vaccination study designed for
1257 rapid deployment during Filovirus outbreaks, using immediate versus delayed vaccination of
1258 contacts and contacts of contacts of laboratory-confirmed cases. The platform was activated
1259 during the 2022 Sudan virus outbreak in Uganda as the Tokomeza trial, although enrollment
1260 did not occur before outbreak resolution, and was reactivated in January 2025 during a
1261 subsequent outbreak. In 2025, the Tokomeza trial enrolled 131 participants before outbreak
1262 termination, with immunogenicity follow-up ongoing in a subset of participants.

1263 Building on this experience, the SOLIDARITY platform provides a harmonized, regulator-
1264 approved, clinical trial framework that can be leveraged and scaled across multiple at-risk
1265 countries, supporting rapid trial activation, interoperable data generation, and regulatory-
1266 aligned evaluation of Filovirus vaccine candidates, including SUDV and MARV, during
1267 outbreak responses.

1268 **Reference materials and infrastructure to Support Vaccine Development and** 1269 **Immunogenicity Assessment**

1270 WHO International Standards (IS) are available at www.nibsc.org to support vaccine
1271 development against EBOV (15/262), SUDV (24/124) and MARV (23/146). Evaluated through
1272 large multi-center collaborative studies(101), these calibrants increase the harmonization of the
1273 quantification of binding and neutralizing antibody activity in human serum/plasma, by
1274 allowing results between different studies to be reported in the same unitage, the International
1275 Units (IU). These key operational assets therefore facilitate comparison of humoral response
1276 induced by different vaccine candidates and support the identification of correlates of
1277 protection.

1278 Building on the WHO International Reference Panel for EBOV antibodies (16/344),
1279 comprehensive reference panels composed of a large selection of characterized human
1280 plasma/sera of varying potencies and relevant negative controls, would further support assay
1281 development, validation, technology transfer and performance monitoring, but also the
1282 development of secondary calibrant. Sourcing these samples remains extremely challenging,
1283 particularly for filoviruses, due to limited access to sufficient volume of clinical samples from
1284 vaccinees or convalescent individuals. The Biospecimen Sourcing Initiative (BSI), created by
1285 the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) in partnership with PATH aligns
1286 with the Pandemic Agreement and aims to address this bottle neck and increase collaborative
1287 work between local clinical settings, national regulators, testing laboratories and reference
1288 material producers to expedite the collection and fair distribution of samples obtained from
1289 outbreak survivors. In parallel, the Uganda Virus Research Institute leads the development and
1290 technology transfer of serological assays for filoviruses, as part of the CEPI Centralized
1291 Laboratory Network (CLN), a global consortium of organizations providing testing capacity to
1292 support vaccine evaluation through clinical trials. The reagent resources generated through the
1293 BSI and CLN projects could be further leveraged to maximize the use of reference reagents
1294 across vaccine development programs and minimize duplication of effort.

1295 Additional reagents such as monoclonal antibodies, antiserum, inactivated viruses and
1296 recombinant antigens are available through several repositories or platforms including
1297 www.beiresources.org and www.european-virus-archive.com, and commercially. This offer
1298 could be enriched by panels of GPs and pseudotyped viruses covering different strains to
1299 develop assays that further evaluate the breadth and cross reactivity of vaccine induced
1300 immunity. Pseudotyped viruses are powerful tools to quantify neutralizing activity for the
1301 development of vaccines and therapeutic, and for seroepidemiological studies and have been
1302 produced successfully for(102). These reagents can be produced rapidly and safely at
1303 containment level 2 using available GP sequences and do not require complex virus isolation
1304 from human clinical samples. As such, they are versatile and reliable reagents which could be
1305 deployed in a timely manner during outbreaks. These panels of reagents would ideally be
1306 regularly updated to represent previous and currently circulating strains.

1307 Operational challenges often persist in sourcing and accessing these reagents and further effort
1308 should be made to strengthen networks between infrastructures, create local distribution hubs,
1309 map reagent need, pre-establish legal agreements and streamline supply processes, to maximize
1310 rapid access and help build research capacity in countries the most affected by filoviruses
1311 outbreaks.

1312 **4. Key challenges**

1313 Filovirus vaccine development and deployment continue to face several interrelated challenges
1314 across scientific, regulatory, and operational domains.

1315 From a scientific perspective, major uncertainties remain regarding correlates of protection, the
1316 durability of vaccine-induced immunity, and the respective roles of humoral and cellular
1317 responses. The absence of validated immune thresholds limits the use of immunobridging
1318 approaches and complicates the design and regulatory evaluation of new vaccine candidates,

1319 particularly for SUDV and MARV. In addition, species-specific immune responses and limited
1320 cross-protection between filoviruses constrain the development of multivalent or pan-filovirus
1321 vaccine strategies.

1322 From a development and regulatory standpoint, vaccine pipelines for SUDV and MARV remain
1323 at early to intermediate stages, with no licensed products currently available. Regulatory
1324 fragmentation across countries continues to delay trial initiation and deployment, despite the
1325 existence of mechanisms such as WHO Emergency Use Listing (EUL) and regional reliance
1326 pathways (e.g. AVAREF), which are not yet systematically embedded in preparedness planning.
1327 Early alignment on immunogenicity endpoints, assay standardization, and regulatory
1328 expectations remains insufficient.

1329 Operationally, dependence on a limited number of manufacturers, constrained production
1330 capacity, and complex cold-chain and logistics requirements limit timely vaccine availability,
1331 particularly in resource-constrained and remote settings. Persistent challenges in accessing
1332 critical reagents and biological samples further slow assay development, standardization, and
1333 comparability across studies.

1334 Finally, challenges related to uptake and implementation remain significant. Vaccine acceptance
1335 is strongly influenced by trust, perceived risk, and quality of engagement, while delays in
1336 community acceptance can limit the effectiveness of vaccination strategies during outbreaks.
1337 In addition, important evidence gaps persist for key at-risk populations, including children,
1338 pregnant women, and individuals with comorbidities, which may delay equitable access to
1339 vaccination and the development of context-appropriate recommendations.

1340 **5. Strategic Objectives**

1341

1342 **Short term (0–12 months)**

- 1343 1. Advance the clinical development of SUDV and MARV vaccine candidates toward
1344 licensure, leveraging EBOV licensure experience to guide development pathways
1345 across platforms and candidates.
- 1346 2. Address critical gaps in immune correlates of protection (thresholds and harmonised
1347 assays), functional immunity (neutralisation and Fc-mediated effector functions, where
1348 relevant), and durability of immunity (persistence and kinetics of responses, including
1349 early predictors of durability).
- 1350 3. Ensure outbreak-ready activation of the SOLIDARITY platform and complete
1351 immunogenicity follow-up in Tokomeza trial.
- 1352 4. Align emergency and reliance regulatory pathways through coordinated engagement of
1353 regulators, ethics committees, and trial stakeholders, and strengthen immediate
1354 operational readiness (supply planning, cold chain, surge capacity).
- 1355 5. Design clinical trials to include all at-risk populations, enabling rapid collection of age-
1356 and pregnancy-disaggregated data and early, continuous community engagement to
1357 support culturally appropriate participation in research.

1358

1359 **Medium term (1–3 years)**

- 1360 1. Implement licensure-enabling clinical development pathways for prioritized SUDV and
1361 MARV vaccine candidates, including coordinated Phase 2–3 trial strategies, immune-
1362 bridging approaches, and reliance-based regulatory procedures informed by EBOV
1363 licensure precedents.
- 1364 2. Support clinical development of additional vaccine(s) for EBOV in order to minimize
1365 the risk of a single product/single manufacturer for a key public health threat and explore
1366 options for assessing efficacy with Regulatory Agencies.
- 1367 3. Validate filovirus-specific immune correlates of protection and durability benchmarks
1368 by integrating harmonized humoral, cellular, and innate immune data from multi-
1369 country clinical studies, supported where relevant by non-clinical models, to inform
1370 booster, dose-optimization, and platform-selection strategies.
- 1371 4. Expand and operationalize the SOLIDARITY platform across additional at-risk
1372 countries, with standardized protocols.
- 1373 5. Encourage reagents and clinical samples sharing through repositories to generate
1374 additional reference reagents that support assay development, validation and calibration
1375 against the established WHO International Standards.
- 1376 6. Advance regional regulatory harmonization through systematic use of reliance
1377 mechanisms (e.g. WHO EUL, AVAREF), early alignment on immunogenicity endpoints
1378 and assay standards, and strengthened national regulatory and pharmacovigilance
1379 capacity.
- 1380 7. Embed systematic inclusion of vulnerable populations (children, pregnant women, and
1381 other high-risk groups) into clinical trials and post-deployment studies, supported by
1382 adaptive trial designs, ethical frameworks (e.g. PREVENT), and co-developed, context-
1383 specific vaccination strategies.

1384

1385 **Long term (3+ years)**

- 1386 1. Achieve and sustain licensure of SUDV and MARV vaccine candidates, and embed
1387 platform-based, EBOV-informed development pathways into preparedness planning to
1388 enable rapid adaptation, lifecycle management, and deployment of next-generation or
1389 multivalent filovirus vaccines.
- 1390 2. **Embed validated immune correlates of protection and durability benchmarks** into
1391 regulatory guidance and policy frameworks to support sustainable licensure and
1392 lifecycle management of monovalent first-generation vaccines. Use validated correlates
1393 of protection to test feasible strategies to achieve multivalent immunity using first- or
1394 next-generation filovirus vaccine products. Assess the feasibility of prophylactic
1395 multivalent filovirus immunization (e.g., EBOV+MARV as a single product or as
1396 separate vaccines)
- 1397 3. **Institutionalize outbreak-capable clinical trial, laboratory, and data**
1398 **infrastructures** as standing preparedness assets, with durable governance, financing
1399 mechanisms, and equitable global access to reagents and standards.

- 1400 4. **Institutionalize harmonized regulatory and platform-based approval pathways**
1401 within global and regional preparedness planning, enabling rapid authorization,
1402 updating, and deployment of filovirus vaccines during outbreaks.
- 1403 5. **Establish resilient manufacturing and supply ecosystems** for filovirus vaccines,
1404 including diversified production capacity, cold-chain resilience, and stockpiling
1405 strategies aligned with outbreak-response needs.
- 1406 6. **Institutionalize equity-by-design approaches across filovirus vaccine R&D,**
1407 **regulation, and deployment,** ensuring affordability, inclusivity, sustained community
1408 partnership, and trust before, during, and after outbreaks.
1409

1410 **Transversal considerations**

1411 Filovirus research must integrate cross-cutting principles that address social, ethical, and
1412 systemic challenges to ensure effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes. These
1413 considerations span all research domains—from ecology and diagnostics to therapeutics and
1414 vaccines—and require coordinated, multidisciplinary approaches.

1415 **1. Social sciences**

1416 Filovirus research spans ecology, pathophysiology, diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines, yet
1417 its impact depends on integrating biological insights with social, behavioral, and governance
1418 considerations. Outbreaks emerge from complex human/animal/environment interactions,
1419 where local practices, perceptions, and cultural norms directly influence exposure risk. Rapid
1420 social investigations provide early guidance, but sustained ethnographic research is essential to
1421 capture temporal, social, and contextual variability, informing ethically sound and effective
1422 interventions.

1423 Biological studies of host responses, immune activation, endothelial dysfunction, coagulation,
1424 and tissue repair, identify therapeutic targets and guide diagnostic development. Because animal
1425 models are scarce and ethically sensitive, human samples are often critical for advancing
1426 filovirus research. However, collecting these samples requires culturally adapted consent
1427 processes and trust-building strategies to ensure ethical and feasible participation. Stigma,
1428 mistrust, and fatigue can impede participation across diagnostics, clinical trials, and vaccine
1429 studies, directly affecting data quality, uptake, and outbreak control.

1430 Diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines face common social constraints: fear, misinformation,
1431 and low confidence in authorities limit testing, trial enrollment, and vaccination. Evidence from
1432 filovirus outbreaks shows that embedding social scientists and anthropologists into research
1433 teams, co-designing protocols with communities, ensuring transparent communication, and
1434 involving local leaders substantially improves participation, adherence, and acceptance(103).

1435 This requires a **multi-layered approach** that engages communities, policymakers, and
1436 healthcare workers at every stage of the research cycle.

- 1437 • **Community engagement and participatory design**

1438 ○ Develop **co-designed frameworks** with affected communities to ensure
1439 research aligns with local needs, values, and priorities. This includes involving
1440 community leaders, survivors, and civil society organizations in the design of
1441 surveillance systems, diagnostic strategies, and clinical trials.

1442 ○ Implement **social science assessments** to identify barriers to participation, such
1443 as stigma, mistrust of healthcare systems, or cultural beliefs about disease
1444 transmission. These insights should inform communication strategies and
1445 intervention design.

1446 • **Behavioral and anthropological research**

1447 ○ Conduct **ethnographic studies** to understand how filovirus outbreaks affect
1448 social dynamics

1449 ○ Investigate **risk perception and misinformation** to develop targeted
1450 communication to promote adherence to public health measures, such as testing,
1451 isolation, and vaccination.

1452 ○ Study the **psychosocial impact** of filovirus infections on survivors and their
1453 families, including long-term mental health effects, social reintegration
1454 challenges, and economic consequences. These findings should inform support
1455 programs and policy recommendations.

1456 • **Capacity-building and local ownership and foster cross-regional collaboration**
1457 among social scientists to share best practices and adapt successful strategies to different
1458 cultural and epidemiological settings.

1459 A fully integrated roadmap therefore links ecological surveillance, pathophysiology, diagnostic
1460 strategies, therapeutic development, and vaccination through cross-cutting social and
1461 governance engagement. Interdisciplinary collaboration ensures that interventions are
1462 biologically effective, ethically robust, and socially acceptable, strengthening preparedness and
1463 response while addressing the complex interplay of trust, acceptability, and community
1464 engagement across all stages of filovirus research

1465 **2. Equity and access in filovirus research: an integrated perspective**

1466 Equity and access must be central to filovirus research to ensure that scientific advancements
1467 benefit all populations, particularly those in low-resource and high-risk settings.

1468 Resource disparities pose a major barrier to equity. Advanced pathophysiological tools
1469 (organoids, CRISPR, spatial omics), diagnostics, and laboratory infrastructures are
1470 concentrated in high-income settings, while outbreak-prone regions often face limited research
1471 capacity. Developing affordable, simplified assays, portable diagnostics, and decentralized
1472 platforms, along with equitable funding models that support local laboratories and shared
1473 infrastructures, is essential to reduce dependency and ensure timely, context-relevant data
1474 generation. Diagnostics should be integrate into national health systems and validated filovirus
1475 diagnostics should be available in healthcare facilities, particularly in remote and high-risk areas.

1476 Similar considerations apply to therapeutics and vaccines: prioritizing deployable candidates,
1477 ensuring compassionate use frameworks, and designing study protocols adapted to local norms
1478 strengthen both access and trust.

1479 Strengthening sustainable financing and manufacturing is crucial, as is establishing long-term
1480 financing mechanisms and supporting local manufacturing. Policy and governance frameworks
1481 should also promote equitable data and sample sharing by establishing ethically governed
1482 biobanking. Furthermore, access equity requires strengthening regulatory harmonisation and
1483 advocating for regional and global alignment of regulatory processes, such as the WHO
1484 Emergency Use Listing (EUL) and the African Vaccine Regulatory Forum (AVAREF), to
1485 accelerate approvals for diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.

1486 Vulnerable population (including children, adolescents, pregnant women, people living with
1487 HIV, malnourished individuals, and people with disabilities), are often underrepresented in
1488 research and face heightened exposure during outbreaks. Equity requires their systematic
1489 inclusion across trials, surveillance, and vaccination strategies, guided by ethical frameworks,
1490 culturally adapted consent, and context-sensitive engagement. Transparent communication,
1491 integration of social and behavioral sciences, and codesign with communities are critical to
1492 improving uptake and adherence for diagnostics, clinical trials, therapeutics, and vaccines alike.

1493 Overall, achieving equity in filovirus research demands integrated, interdisciplinary approaches
1494 that address structural, social, and operational barriers. Embedding social and behavioral
1495 sciences, strengthening local capacities, and aligning research and intervention strategies with
1496 community priorities ensure that scientific advances are not only biologically effective but also
1497 ethically sound, accessible, and socially acceptable, ultimately enhancing outbreak
1498 preparedness and response in the regions most affected.

1499 **3. Cross cutting Issues**

1500 Across the five working groups, several issues consistently emerged as structural constraints
1501 and shared scientific needs. These cross-cutting challenges affect the feasibility, comparability,
1502 and impact of filovirus research and preparedness activities across all priority families and their
1503 associated CORCs.

- 1504 • Survivor cohorts : Survivors have become central actors in filovirus ecology,
1505 physiopathology, and countermeasure development. Virus ecology indicates that
1506 survivors may act as secondary reservoirs, capable of reintroducing the virus into
1507 human populations. From a physiopathological perspective, there is a need to better
1508 understand viral persistence in immune-privileged sites and the mechanisms of
1509 recrudescence. In addition, the development of therapeutics, vaccines, and diagnostics
1510 depends on well-structured survivor cohorts to validate biomarkers, assess viral
1511 clearance, and evaluate medical countermeasures.

1512 **Recommendation:**

1513 Establish, harmonize, and sustain survivor cohorts through robust ethical frameworks and
1514 efficient logistical pipelines.

- 1515 • Access to samples, biobanking, and regulatory bottlenecks : All working groups
1516 identified major constraints in obtaining, storing, and sharing clinical, ecological, and
1517 environmental samples. Regulatory delays continue to limit international sample
1518 transfers. At the same time, ecological studies require longitudinal wildlife sampling,
1519 and countermeasure development depends on access to contemporary isolates and
1520 standardized reference materials.

1521 **Recommendation:**

1522 Develop harmonized, ethical, and rapid mechanisms for sample access and biobanking,
1523 particularly in endemic regions.

- 1524 • Standardization and interoperability of data, protocols, and models : A lack of
1525 standardization remains a major barrier across research domains. There is limited
1526 availability of internationally validated reference reagents, while sampling and testing
1527 protocols vary across studies. In addition, countermeasure development relies on
1528 reproducible animal and organoid models, which are not yet sufficiently harmonized.

1529 **Recommendations:**

1530 Define minimal common frameworks for standard operating procedures (SOPs), metadata,
1531 study endpoints, and reference panels to ensure comparability and accelerate translation.
1532 Establish pre-negotiated agreements to enable rapid and real-time sharing of surveillance,
1533 genomic, and clinical data among ministries of health, research institutions, and international
1534 partners.

1535 **Conclusion**

1536 The five working groups provide a comprehensive overview of the scientific, operational, and
1537 societal challenges that continue to shape filovirus research and preparedness. The updated
1538 roadmap shows that progress has been substantial across all thematic areas: ecological
1539 surveillance has expanded, physiopathology has clarified early infection and immune-evasion
1540 mechanisms, countermeasures have advanced with licensed monoclonal antibodies and
1541 vaccines, and diagnostic capacity has improved through faster, more deployable tools. These
1542 advances have translated into concrete operational gains. Recent responses have been faster,
1543 better coordinated, and more effective than in previous decades, with quicker case detection,
1544 earlier deployment of mobile laboratories, and accelerated activation of clinical trial platforms
1545 and preventive interventions, as highlighted in multiple WHO outbreak reviews.

1546 Yet the working groups also converge on the persistent gaps that still constrain filovirus
1547 preparedness—uncertainty around reservoirs, incomplete understanding of viral persistence,
1548 limited tools for non-EBOV viruses, uneven laboratory capacity, and the need for harmonised
1549 assays and interoperable data systems. Social sciences emerge as an essential integrative
1550 component across all groups. They illuminate how human–animal interactions influence
1551 spillover risk, how survivors face stigma and barriers to follow-up, and how community
1552 perceptions shape the acceptance of diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics. They also provide
1553 the frameworks needed to sustain engagement, guide communication strategies, and ensure that
1554 research and interventions remain grounded in local realities.

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
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